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Article 1

ARTICLES

The Legislative Response to Mass
Police Surveillance
Stephen Rushin†
INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, police departments have
dramatically expanded the use of advanced surveillance
technologies. In 1997, around 20% of American police
departments reported using some type of technological
surveillance. 1 By 2007, that number had risen to over 70%. 2
And no longer do police rely exclusively on basic surveillance
technologies. The increasingly efficient and technologically
advanced law enforcement of the twenty-first century utilizes a
wide range of surveillance devices including automatic license
plate readers (ALPR),3 surveillance cameras,4 red light cameras,5
speed cameras,6 and biometric technology like facial recognition.7

† Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. I owe a
debt of gratitude to the participants in the “Privacy, Surveillance Technologies, and the
Fourth Amendment” panel at the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting for
their thoughtful feedback.
1 U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, LAW
ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS (LEMAS): 1997 SAMPLE
SURVEYS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (1997) [hereinafter LEMAS 1997], available
at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/2700?q=1997+LEMAs (to access
follow “Log In/Create Account” hyperlink; once registered, follow the “codebook.pdf”
hyperlink on the LEMAS 1997 page) (defining surveillance as the percentage of total
departments that report using some type of video cameras).
2 U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, LAW
ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS (LEMAS): 2007 SAMPLE
SURVEYS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2007) [hereinafter LEMAS 2007], available
at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/31161 (defining surveillance as
the percentage of total departments that report using some type of video cameras).
3 See, e.g., Ryan Gallagher, Police Across U.S. Quietly Turning to Cameras
That Track All Vehicles’ Movements: Survey, SLATE (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/future_tense/2013/01/14/automatic_license_plate_readers_survey_shows_most_u_
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I have previously called this radical shift in policing the
beginning of the digitally efficient investigative state.8 By this, I
mean that police today utilize technological replacements for
traditional investigations that dramatically improve the
efficiency of surveillance. These digitally efficient technologies
do not give police any unique extrasensory ability.9 They merely
improve the efficiency of public surveillance. Furthermore, these
technologies only collect information on public movements and
behaviors. They do not intrude on any constitutionally protected
or private space.10 However, these tools have developed into a
form of widespread community surveillance, which presents
privacy concerns for many members of the community.
In addressing public surveillance under the Fourth
Amendment, the Supreme Court has previously operated under
two important presumptions. I call these two general rules the
jurisprudential assumptions of police surveillance. First,
individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in any
activities they make in public that may be visible to law
enforcement. 11 So while officers need probable cause or a
warrant to enter a home or automobile, they do not need any
s_police_agencies_plan.html (noting recent surveys indicating that ALPR is spreading
throughout American police departments).
4 See, e.g., City Looks at Outside Firm to Oversee Police Surveillance
Cameras, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT & CHRON., Jan. 4, 2013, (explaining how in cities like
Rochester, the installation of over 200 surveillance cameras in the City now requires
the hiring of a private company to monitor the cameras).
5 See, e.g., Larry Barszewski, Fort Lauderdale to Add More Red-Light
Cameras, SUN SENTINEL (Jan. 23, 2013), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-01-23/
news/fl-brief-lauderdale-red-light-cameras-20130123_1_american-traffic-solutions-redlight-cameras-intersection-approaches (noting that that cities like Fort Lauderdale are
moving to install more red light cameras).
6 See, e.g., Erin Cox, State Highway Administration Defends Speed Camera
Program, BALT. SUN (Jan. 15, 2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-15/news/
bs-md-speed-camera-briefing-20130115_1_camera-tickets-camera-law-camera-program
(discussing Maryland’s significant investment in speed cameras across the state).
7 See, e.g., Eric Hartley, LAPD’s 16 San Fernando Valley Surveillance
Cameras Go Live, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 16, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://www.dailynews.com/
general-news/20130117/lapds-16-san-fernando-valley-surveillance-cameras-go-live
(mentioning that surveillance cameras used by the LAPD use facial recognition software
technology that can identify a person from 600 feet away).
8 See Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance,
2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 281 (2011).
9 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
10 This distinction between public and private is important. See United
States. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983) (noting that “[a] person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another”).
11 See, e.g., Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (determining that a person has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in their public movements on roads or highways);
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (holding that a person has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the phone numbers they dial); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 360 (1967) (establishing standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy).
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authorization to investigate or record a person’s activities in
public. Second, while technologies that give the state an
extrasensory ability may violate an individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy, technologies that merely improve the
efficiency of otherwise permissible investigation techniques are
presumptively permissible.12 Thus, while officers must obtain a
warrant before using some extrasensory technologies, the Court
generally does not regulate efficiency-enhancing technologies.
These jurisprudential assumptions of police surveillance have
been workable in the past because of the limited use and
capability of efficiency-enhancing technologies.
I have previously argued, however, that in the age of the
digitally efficient investigative state, efficiency-enhancing
technologies have become sufficiently intrusive as to demand a
new doctrinal path. 13 In United States v. Jones, the Supreme
Court considered one such efficiency-enhancing surveillance
technology—global positioning systems (GPS). 14 There, law
enforcement officers installed a GPS device on a suspect’s car
without a valid warrant.15 The government argued that the police
did not need a warrant to install the GPS device because it was
merely an efficient replacement for an otherwise legal police
investigation tactic—public surveillance. 16 But Antoine Jones
claimed that he had a reasonable expectation that all of his
movements over the course of a month would not be recorded in
great detail by the state, even if they were executed in public.17
The Jones case presented the perfect opportunity for the
Court to amend one or both of the jurisprudential assumptions of
police surveillance, but the Court punted the issue. The majority
merely found that the installation of a GPS device violated the
Fourth Amendment because of the device’s physical installation
on the automobile. 18 Post-Jones, many academics criticized the
Court for not addressing the privacy issues raised by police
surveillance technologies. 19 I believe the Court will eventually
regulate the digitally efficient investigative state in some manner.
Indeed, dicta in the concurrences by Justices Sotomayor and Alito
12 Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the
Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV . 409, 433-39 (2007).
13 Rushin, supra note 8, at 282.
14 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
15 Id. at 948.
16 Id. at 949-50.
17 See id.
18 Id. at 953.
19 See, e.g., Lauren Millcarek, Comment, Eighteenth Century Law, TwentyFirst Century Problems: Jones, GPS Tracking, and the Future of Privacy, 64 FLA. L.
REV. 1101 (2012).
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suggest that the Court will be receptive to broader regulation of
efficiency-enhancing surveillance technology in the near future.20
Nevertheless, history dictates that any judicial regulation will be
limited and likely rely on the often-ineffective exclusionary rule
for enforcement.21 As a result, Congress and state legislators must
play a significant role in any future regulation of police
surveillance. Given that law enforcement in the United States is
highly decentralized, 22 much of this regulation will have to
come from state legislatures.
In this article, I present a model statute that a state could
enact to regulate the digitally efficient investigative state. This
statute adheres to three major principles about the regulation of
police surveillance. First, any regulation must provide clear
standards that law enforcement can easily understand and
apply. 23 Second, as communities differ substantially in their
need for public surveillance, any legislation must provide local
municipalities with some ability to vary standards to meet
their legitimate law enforcement needs. Third, any regulation
must articulate the narrow scope of technologies and devices
that fall under its regulatory purview. Because technology
changes rapidly, this ensures that the law will not be
misapplied to future, emerging technologies.
The model statute I offer in this article honors these three
important principles. The statute regulates the indiscriminate
collection and retention of data by law enforcement surveillance
technologies, while also permitting the use of technological
surveillance for mere observational comparison. The statute
20 See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that
“physical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of surveillance. With increasing
regularity, the Government will be capable of duplicating the monitoring undertaken
in this case by enlisting factory- or owner-installed vehicle tracking devices or GPSenabled smartphones. In cases of electronic or other novel modes of surveillance that do
not depend upon a physical invasion on property, the majority opinion’s trespassory
test may provide little guidance” (citations omitted)).
21 See Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing
Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 10 (2009) (noting that the exclusionary rule is “by far the
most commonly used means of discouraging police misconduct,” which is ineffective
because of its numerous exceptions and narrow scope).
22 See Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police
Misconduct: A Model State “Pattern or Practice” Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 479,
484 (2009) (noting that American law enforcement is “organizationally fragmented”
meaning that “there is no single controlling authority that could presumably establish
minimal standards for personnel, operations, and accountability procedures”).
23 Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward
Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data That Congress
Could Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 124 (2012) (noting the importance of clear
and articulable rules for law enforcement); Charlie Savage, Judges Divided over Rising
GPS Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2010, at A12 (Professor Orin Kerr arguing that
police need clear rules).
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establishes a maximum length of time for data retention. It also
limits the sharing of personally identifiable information, and
requires that law enforcement demonstrate a legitimate
investigative purpose for identifying and accessing data. To
enforce these broad regulations, the statute gives the state
attorney general the authority to bring lawsuits against police
departments that fail to abide by these regulations and
excludes from criminal court any locational evidence obtained
in violation of the statute.
This statute would not address all of the concerns of the
digitally efficient investigative state. After all, no statute can
fully predict and control the development of new and emerging
technologies. Nevertheless, it would be a major step toward
coherency. This legislation would give a police department
discretion to craft unique data policies tailored to its community’s
specific needs, while also encouraging some level of statewide
consistency. To date, only a small handful of law review articles
have addressed the unique issues raised by digitally efficient
community surveillance technology, such as automatic license
plate readers (ALPR). 24 Furthermore, none of this work has
offered a comprehensive legislative response that could guide
future regulation. Thus, this article fills a void in the available
legal scholarship.
I have divided this article into four parts. In Part I, I
detail the growth and capabilities of the digitally efficient
investigative state. I compile the most comprehensive set of
data to date on the scope of digitally efficient investigative
technologies in American police departments. I also present
empirical evidence on the current state of internal departmental
regulations. In Part II, I explore the law of police surveillance. In
this Part, I further detail the jurisprudential assumptions about
police surveillance that have guided the Court in the past. PostJones, it appears that these jurisprudential assumptions may no
longer be valid, drastically increasing the incoherence of police
surveillance law. Part III offers a comprehensive legislative
response intended to curb the potentially dangerous effects of
24 See, e.g., Jeremy Brown, Pan, Tilt, Zoom: Regulating the Use of Video
Surveillance of Public Places, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 755 (2008); Olivia J. Greer, No
Cause of Action: Video Surveillance in New York City, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 589 (2012); Linda M. Merola & Cynthia Lum, Emerging Surveillance Technologies:
Privacy and the Case of License Plate Recognition (LPR) Technology, 96 JUDICATURE 119
(2012); Jeffrey H. Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration of the
Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future, 11 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 27 (1995); Rushin, supra note 8; Tyson E. Hubbard, Note,
Automatic License Plate Recognition: An Exciting New Law Enforcement Tool with
Potentially Scary Consequences, 18 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 3 (2008).

6

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:1

mass police surveillance. I present and defend my proposed
statutory regulation. Currently only a few states in the country
regulate the use of any type of police surveillance technology.25
I argue that this lack of regulation is increasingly indefensible.
Both states and the judiciary must eventually take steps to
comprehensively limit the use of digitally efficient community
surveillance technologies.
I.

THE DIGITALLY EFFICIENT INVESTIGATIVE STATE

Two years ago, I theorized on the emergence of a new type
of policing that I called the digitally efficient investigative state.26
This new type of policing relies on numerous technological
surveillance methods that replace traditional policing tactics.
Two classic examples of technologies used by the digitally
efficient investigate state are video surveillance cameras with
biometric recognition and automatic license plate readers
(ALPR). I have argued that the advent of these new
technologies demands a new type of regulatory response. In the
first part of this section, I detail the characteristics of the
digitally efficient investigative state.
In the second part of this section, I summarize the most
up-to-date empirical data on the expansion of the digitally
efficient investigative state. Since I theorized on this emerging
institution of social control two years ago, surveys by social
science researchers have uncovered important new information
about the growth and scope of the use of digitally efficient
investigative technologies in American police departments. In
this subsection, I also explore the current state of internal
departmental regulations of mass surveillance technologies. The
available evidence paints a pessimistic picture. Departments
rarely self-regulate their collection of data or reveal their data
retention policies. This failure to effectively self-regulate
presents a cogent argument for legislative action.
A.

The Characteristics of the Digitally Efficient
Investigative State

I define the digitally efficient investigative state as a
technologically advanced form of policing, reliant upon
efficiency-enhancing surveillance of an entire community. The
digitally efficient investigative state seeks not just to monitor
25 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. 29-A, § 2117-A (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 236:130 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3800 (2010).
26 Rushin, supra note 8, at 284.
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the activities of a single suspicious individual, but instead
relies on widespread surveillance of the entire community. Two
of the most common technologies used in the digitally efficient
investigative state are ALPR and surveillance cameras with
biometric recognition. Although most in the public are familiar
with the capabilities of surveillance cameras, ALPR and
biometric recognition are relatively new additions to the field of
police surveillance. ALPR devices use “digital cameras mounted
on a law enforcement vehicle or at stationary locations to snap
images of passing license plates.”27 ALPR systems then convert
these digital images of license plates into text files. 28 Once
converted, ALPR systems can either “compare[ ] the plate
numbers to available databases, often called hotlists,” or they
can store the data into searchable databases.29 Video surveillance
cameras have long served as a replacement for traditional, inperson police observation.30 But today these surveillance cameras
are increasingly armed with biometric recognition, like facial
recognition software, which “permit law enforcement to identify
the individuals captured by surveillance cameras” based on
their facial features.31
Nine important characteristics define the digitally
efficient investigative state. First, this policing technique only
involves the collection of information on public behavior made
visible to law enforcement. ALPR and surveillance cameras do
not intrude into any private or protected space. This is different
from other policing technologies like wiretaps or heat sensors.
Wiretaps allow police to listen to conversations that were not
publicly “broadcast to the world.”32 Heat sensors permit police to
see “details of the home that would previously have been
unknowable without physical intrusion.” 33 Digitally efficient
surveillance technologies, conversely, merely record information
about observable behavior made visible to the devices. ALPR
chronicles license plates as vehicles pass stationary or mobile
ALPR cameras, and surveillance cameras record video, and
occasionally audio, of public actions. The public nature of
digitally efficient surveillance is a primary reason that the
judiciary has historically avoided regulating these technologies.

27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Id. at 285.
Id.
See id. at 285-86.
Id.
Id. at 288.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
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Second, the public information collected by these
technologies is often personally identifiable. That is to say, once
a digitally efficient surveillance device records an image of a
license plate or a pedestrian, law enforcement can often
identify the driver or pedestrian. Police using ALPR commonly
cross-reference license plate numbers with state records of
automobile owners to detect stolen cars or wanted criminals.34
At least “[t]hirty-seven states currently load driver’s license
photographs into state databases, which are searchable using
facial recognition software.”35 In both cases, police are able to
take data collected via these efficiency-enhancing technologies
and connect it to a specific individual.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) defines personally identifiable information as “any
information that can be used to distinguish or trace an
individual’s identity . . . and other information that is linked or
linkable [to a specific person’s identity].”36 Classic examples of
personally identifiable information would be a person’s name,
address, and telephone number. 37 The NIST also considers
biometric data, including photographic images and videos, vehicle
identifiers, and property records, to be personally identifiable.38
Under this broad definition, data recovered by digitally efficient
technologies is undeniably personally identifiable information.
Police can easily link a car’s license plate number to a specific
owner. And police can often use biometric data from surveillance
cameras—commonly facial recognition—to identify a pedestrian
on the street. Thus, once digitally efficient surveillance
technologies collect data, this data can be linked or connected
with a specific person through cross-reference to other
government databases.
Third, these technologies involve not just narrow
observation of a single suspect, but the broad surveillance of an
entire community over an extended period of time. This is
different than less expansive surveillance technologies
34 See CYNTHIA LUM ET AL., CTR. FOR EVIDENCE BASED CRIME POL’Y, GEORGE
MASON UNIV., LICENSE PLATE RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY: IMPACT EVALUATION AND
COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT 21 (2010), available at http://gemini.gmu.edu/cebcp/lpr_
final.pdf; Rushin, supra note 8, at 285-86.
35 Rushin, supra note 8, at 288 (citing Joey Bunch, Smiling Upon Grins: Colorado
Allows Expressions That Other States Say Mess Up Driver’s License Software, DENVER
POST, May 30, 2009, at B2, available at http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_12481772).
36 ERIKA MCCALLISTER ET AL., NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF PERSONALLY
IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (PII) 2-1 (2010), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/
publications/nistpubs/800-122/sp800-122.pdf.
37 Id. at 2-2.
38 Id.
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previously considered by the Court, like GPS. A single GPS
device affixed to an automobile can give police detailed
information on the movements of a single automobile for an
extended period of time.39 A GPS device, however, is limited in
scope. It only monitors and records the movements of a single
criminal suspect at a time. This limits the broad community
impact of GPS surveillance. Police have to identify an
individual as a criminal suspect and then install the device to
facilitate surveillance. By contrast, the technologies I describe
as part of the digitally efficient investigative state broadly and
indiscriminately monitor the public behavior of an entire
community. Surveillance cameras record any and all behavior
made public in front of their lenses. ALPR devices run the
license plates of all automobiles that fall within the device’s
view. Thus, every person in a community becomes a target of
the digitally efficient investigative state, not just pre-identified
criminal suspects.
Fourth, because the digitally efficient investigative state
monitors the entire community, it collects information on
illegal activity as well as innocuous behavior. Some policing
technologies, like red light and speed cameras, have been
narrowly devised to only record images and collect data when a
person violates a traffic law. The digitally efficient investigative
state is different. Devices like ALPR and surveillance cameras
are useful because they collect data on all passing cars and
pedestrians. A single ALPR device or surveillance camera might
replace the efforts of dozens, even hundreds, of individual law
enforcement officers. ALPR, for example, is only useful because
it is an unbelievably efficient replacement for a traditional
policing technique—cross-referencing the license plates of
passing cars with databases of active warrants and stolen
automobiles. But when a device can cross-reference and record
data on up to 1,800 license plates per minute,40 it will invariably
gather enormous amounts of data on innocent people.
Fifth, the technological tools used by the digitally
efficient investigative state only improve the efficiency of
otherwise permissible surveillance techniques. They do not
offer officers any extrasensory ability. Many technological
developments in policing have been met with suspicion because
they give police a superhuman ability not typically associated
39 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012) (noting that law
enforcement gathered data on Antoine Jones’s movements in his automobile for 28
days straight).
40 Rushin, supra note 8, at 285.
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with public policing. For example, in Kyllo, the Court barred
the warrantless use of heat sensors that could allow police to see
movements inside the walls of the home.41 ALPR, surveillance
cameras, and facial recognition arguably all complete tasks that
an individual officer could complete without technological
assistance. They just do so with astonishing efficiency.
Sixth, these technologies give officers two distinct
capabilities: observational comparison and indiscriminate data
collection. Observational comparison refers to the limited and
temporary collection of data by a digitally efficient technology
for comparison and cross-reference to relevant databases. For
example, “[w]hen used for observation comparison, ALPR only
retains data on license plates that match known or suspected
criminal hotlists.”42 In the case of surveillance cameras armed
with facial recognition, “the collection of data would be limited
to individuals whose appearance so closely resembles a known
criminal as to create reasonable, individualized suspicion.”43 By
contrast, indiscriminate data collection refers to data retention
practices whereby police indefinitely retain all information
collected by digitally efficient technologies, regardless of
whether the data is linked to any criminal investigation.
Seventh, advances in data storage capabilities have
facilitated and incentivized the use of these technologies for
indiscriminate data collection. Traditionally, one of the greatest
limitations on long-term government surveillance was the
limited data retention capabilities of the state.44 But as the cost
of data storage decreases, and the technological feasibility of
such storage improves,45 the government has no disincentive to
collect as much data as possible on public behavior—so long as
this information might be useful to a state.46 In the case of law
enforcement, information may seem irrelevant at the time of
collection, but may end up being extremely valuable in solving
future crimes. 47 Indeed, as I discuss in Part I.C, the only
empirical evidence suggests that the overwhelming majority of

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
Rushin, supra note 8, at 285.
43 Id. at 288.
44 See Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93
MINN. L. REV. 1, 14 (2008).
45 See Patricia L. Bellia, The Memory Gap in Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 137, 140-42 (2008).
46 See Rushin, supra note 8, at 291.
47 Id. at 286 (describing the hypothetical situation where a child is abducted,
and police can immediately turn to surveillance data from the time and location of the
suspected abduction).
41
42
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departments with digitally efficient surveillance technology,
like ALPR, use it for indiscriminate data collection.48
Eighth, indiscriminate data collection allows law
enforcement to aggregate large amounts of information about a
single individual, thereby revealing personal information about
habits and behaviors. Five of the justices in Jones noted in two
separate concurrences that the accumulation of large amounts of
data on public movements transforms normal surveillance into a
potentially unconstitutional invasion of individual privacy. 49
These extensive records on individual movements might reveal
private interests, patterns of behavior, or habits. For example,
aggregation of surveillance data of an individual might enable
“the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political
and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”50 Police and the
state can use this type of revealing personal information to
target unpopular minorities or conduct fishing expeditions.51
Ninth, departments commonly share this personally
identifiable information. Police have organized both nationally
and regionally to share personally identifiable surveillance
data.52 As I explain further in Part I.C, the limited empirical
data suggest that departments currently share data collected
through digitally efficient surveillance technologies. 53 The
sharing of this data is understandable and potentially useful.
Criminals, like most individuals, often move in and out of
different police jurisdictions. Information sharing allows police
to efficiently identify not just criminals and stolen property
from their jurisdiction, but also those from jurisdictions across
the country. In a country like the United States with an
extremely decentralized array of policing agencies, this type of
data sharing can facilitate cooperation and dramatically
increase the likelihood of apprehending criminals and recovering
stolen property. For example, Cincinnati is currently building a
regional data-sharing network for ALPR data for departments
across Southwest Ohio, Southeast Indiana and Northern
Kentucky, called SOSINK. The purpose of this regional
network is to both apprehend wanted subjects traveling across
this regional territory and collect intelligence relevant to

See infra Part I.C.
See generally United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955-64 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring & Alito, J., concurring).
50 Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
51 See Rushin, supra note 8, at 299.
52 Id. at 292.
53 See infra Part I.C.
48
49
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ongoing investigations in departments throughout the area.54
Maryland law enforcement has developed a similar datasharing network. 55 The state hopes to eventually have 32
agencies sharing information.56
This type of regional data sharing of surveillance data is
relatively common; one study found that 43% of surveyed
departments share data as part of a regional system.57 But this
type of sharing is also potentially problematic. Such sharing of
personally identifiable data may increase the possibility of
“secondary use.”58 As Daniel Solove explains, “[t]he potential for
secondary use generates fear and uncertainty over how one’s
information will be used in the future, creating a sense of
powerlessness and vulnerability.”59
The expansion of the digitally efficient investigative
state is one of the most important developments in the history
of policing. Digitally efficient surveillance technologies expand
the reach of American police departments. Emerging evidence
over the last two decades suggests that police presence may
actually reduce crime by altering situational incentives.60 One
possible way to lower the overall crime rate of a community,
then, is to increase the number of law enforcement officers.61
But local communities must operate on finite budgets, limiting
the number of police officers they can hire. Thus, criminologists
and policing scholars have found that departments can most
effectively reduce crime by allocating more of their staff to high

54 See Russell A. Neville, Cincinnati Regional Automatic License Plate
Recognition Technology Project, POLICE CHIEF MAG. (June 2009), available at
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_
id=1823&issue_id=62009.
55 See Press Release, Office of Governor Martin O’Malley, Governor Martin
O’Malley Announces Enhanced Fight Against Auto Theft (Aug. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.governor.maryland.gov/pressreleases/100804.asp.
56 DAVID J. ROBERTS & MEGHANN CASANOVA, INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF
POLICE, AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE RECOGNITION SYSTEMS: POLICY AND OPERATIONAL
GUIDANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 24 (2012).
57 Id.
58 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 477, 521 (2006).
59 Id. at 522.
60 See generally Ronald V. G. Clarke, ‘Situational’ Crime Prevention: Theory
and Practice, 20 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 136 (1980) (describing situational crime
prevention theory and how supervision of any variety, including police, can affect an
individual’s propensity for criminal behavior); Lawrence W. Sherman & David
Weisburd, General Deterrent Effects of Police Patrol in Crime “Hot Spots”: A
Randomized, Controlled Trial, 12 JUST. Q. 625 (1995).
61 See generally Steven D. Levitt, Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to
Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime, 87 AMER. ECON. REV. 270 (1997); AARON
CHALFIN & JUSTIN MCCRARY, U. C. BERKELEY, THE EFFECT OF POLICE ON CRIME: NEW
EVIDENCE FROM U.S. CITIES, 1960–2010 (2012).
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crime neighborhoods, or hot spots.62 A strong body of empirical
case studies shows that such hot spot policing can reduce, and
not merely displace, crime.63
All of these theories of crime reduction rely upon a
principal assumption: police cannot be everywhere at once. Thus,
scholars in this field try to find methods to improve the efficiency
of police activity. The digitally efficient investigative state
radically shifts this fundamental assumption of policing and
crime control theory. Early quantitative studies on the effects of
digitally efficient technologies have returned mixed results on its
crime fighting abilities.64 But if these technologies do become tools
for deterrence, investigation, and criminal apprehension, their
crime fighting ability will be virtually unmatched by any other
technological development in recent history.
Legal scholars and policymakers should look at this
trend in policing innovation as a potential tool for both crime
control and a source of potential widespread privacy violations.
A growing body of evidence confirms that law enforcement uses
these surveillance technologies to target minority groups. 65
Psychological and historical evidence suggests that the
availability of pervasive surveillance tools may facilitate law
enforcement corruption. 66 With the unregulated ability to
monitor an entire community, law enforcement may be
incentivized to conduct fishing expeditions that “exacerbate
racism, stereotyping, or profiling.” 67 This elevates the risk of
false positives and harms citizens’ perceptions of procedural
fairness.68 Thus, while the digitally efficient investigative state
may be an important development for crime prevention, it also
raises numerous privacy concerns.

62 See generally David Weisburd & Anthony A. Braga, Hot Spots Policing as a
Model for Police Innovation, in POLICE INNOVATION 225 (2006).
63 See, e.g., Anthony A. Braga, Hot Spots Policing and Crime Prevention: A
Systematic Review of Randomized Controlled Trials, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY
317 (2005) (finding that the majority of empirical studies support the effectiveness of
hot spot policing).
64 Compare Jennifer King et al., Fighting Crime with Publicly-Financed
Surveillance Cameras: The San Francisco Experience, CAL. POL’Y OPTIONS 2009 145, 158
(2009), available at http://www.spa.ucla.edu/webfiles/doc/116679final.pdf (explaining how
the installation of 19 surveillance cameras in San Francisco correlated with a subsequent
reduction in crime), with LUM ET AL., supra note 34, at 27-59 (finding that ALPR devices
had no significant effect on crime in a single case study).
65 See Rushin, supra note 8, at 299.
66 Id. at 300-01.
67 Id. at 300.
68 See id. at 301-02.
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Empirical Evidence on the Scope of Surveillance
Technologies

Despite the importance of the digitally efficient
investigative state, no comprehensive research has fully
documented the extent to which police departments across the
country have adopted these new surveillance technologies. To
better illustrate the magnitude of the digitally efficient
investigative state, I have gathered survey data from four
sources: (1) the Law Enforcement Management and
Administration Statistics (LEMAS), (2) the International
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), (3) the Police Executive
Research Forum (PERF), and (4) independent surveys conducted
by academics researching police organizations.
The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) publishes the
LEMAS data every three to four years as part of a
comprehensive survey of approximately 3,000 state and local
law enforcement agencies. 69 Because the BJS conducts the
LEMAS survey semi-regularly, this data set is useful for
observing changes over time in police behavior. But the BJS
survey data only gives information on the current use of various
surveillance technologies. So far, the BJS has not collected data
on departmental policies on surveillance data retention.
The data from the IACP and PERF comes from a
handful of one-time surveys. Fewer departments respond to
IACP and PERF surveys than BJS requests. Nonetheless, the
IACP and PERF studies often include detailed questions on
departments’ data retention, usage, and access policies—
something the LEMAS study lacks. The IACP and PERF
surveys also have included information on future plans for the
technology and law enforcement departments’ participation in
regional data sharing.
1. Surveillance Cameras and Biometric Recognition
Surveillance cameras are nearly ubiquitous in American
police departments. According to the 1997 LEMAS survey, nearly
700—or approximately 20% of all departments responding to the
question—reported using some type of surveillance cameras.70 In
the following decade, the percentage of departments increased

69 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DATA COLLECTION:
LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS, available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=248 (last visited Aug. 28, 2013).
70 LEMAS 1997, supra note 1.
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dramatically to 56% in 2000, 67% in 2003, and 71% in 2007.71
Between 1997 and 2007, the number of departments using
surveillance cameras increased by 189%. The IACP study
similarly found that departments regularly employed
surveillance cameras. In a 2001 survey of 207 police agencies,
around 80% claimed to use some type of surveillance camera.72
Although the IACP survey found that a higher number of
departments used surveillance cameras around the turn of the
century than the LEMAS survey, this discrepancy can be traced
to the demographic profiles of the departments responding to
each survey instrument. 73 It is safe to say that, while
surveillance cameras were relatively rare two decades ago, they
are extremely common today. Figure 1 shows the historical
trend in police use of surveillance cameras over time.
FIGURE 1, PERCENTAGE OF POLICE DEPARTMENTS USING
ANY CAMERA SURVEILLANCE74

71 U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, LAW
ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS (LEMAS): 2000 SAMPLE
SURVEYS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2000) [hereinafter LEMAS 2000], available
at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/series/92/studies/3565; U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS (LEMAS): 2003 SAMPLE SURVEYS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES (2003) [hereinafter LEMAS 2003], available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/
icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/04411; LEMAS 2007, supra note 2.
72 LAURA J. NICHOLS, INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, CUTTING EDGE OF
TECHNOLOGY EXECUTIVE BRIEF: THE USE OF CCTV/VIDEO CAMERAS IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT 4, 15 (2001).
73 See id. at 14 (explaining the breakdown of the survey pool—including the
relative amount of larger departments surveyed).
74 LEMAS 2007, supra note 2; LEMAS 2003, supra note 71; LEMAS 2000,
supra note 71; LEMAS 1997, supra note 1. In calculating the data for Figure 1, I group
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The actual number of surveillance cameras used by
individual departments also varies widely from one department
to the next. But overall, the number of cameras employed by
the average American police department has increased steadily
over the last decade. The LEMAS survey first kept records on
the number of surveillance cameras used by departments in
2000, when the average department reported employing around
10 surveillance cameras. 75 The police in the United States in
2000 operated just under 30,000 total cameras.76 By 2007, the
average department utilized nearly 27 cameras, or a total of
nearly 77,000 nationwide.77 This represents a 161% increase in
total cameras and a 170% increase in cameras per department
over a mere seven-year period. Figure 2 graphically illustrates
the trend in the average number of surveillance cameras per
department over a 10 year period.
FIGURE 2, AVERAGE NUMBER OF SURVEILLANCE
CAMERAS PER DEPARTMENT78

The LEMAS data may also dramatically underestimate
the actual number of surveillance cameras used by police in the
United States. Many cities, like Chicago, give police access to
an integrated network of surveillance cameras—public transit
cameras, police cameras, and school cameras. Estimates range

together in this calculation three categories of surveillance cameras: fixed cameras,
mobile cameras, and cameras mounted on squad cars.
75 LEMAS 2000, supra note 71.
76 Id.
77 LEMAS 2007, supra note 2.
78 Id.; LEMAS 2003, supra note 71; LEMAS 2000, supra note 71.

2013]

MASS POLICE SURVEILLANCE

17

from 8,00079 cameras to 15,00080 cameras. When responding to
the LEMAS survey, Chicago reported use of only 1,073 cameras
in 2007. 81 In all likelihood, this number only represents the
number of cameras installed and operated exclusively by
police—not the number of cameras used by the city and
monitored in some manner by law enforcement. Thus, the
LEMAS conclusions almost certainly underestimate the actual
number of cameras that police access regularly.
In other IACP surveys, police departments have also
rated surveillance cameras as among the highest priority
targets for continued technological investment. A 2005 study of
47 law enforcement departments asked administrators to rate the
relative importance of future investments in different
investigative technologies.82 Video cameras were among the top
five most important sources for future technological investment.83
Overall, biometric recognition systems, like facial
recognition, seem to be rarely used by the average police
department. In the LEMAS survey, only 191 departments
claimed to use the technology in 2003 and 98 in 2007. 84 But
according to the IACP study, departments indicated a significant
interest in investing in facial recognition technology in the
future. 85 In addition, the majority of law enforcement
administrators believe facial recognition will be of high value to
departments in the future.86
2. Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPR)
There is less historical data on the adoption of ALPR
devices. The LEMAS surveys only recently started asking
departments about their use of ALPR. The 2007 LEMAS
survey was the first. Only 170 departments or about 19% of
those agencies that responded to the survey question claimed
79 NANCY G. LA VINGE ET AL., URBAN INST., EVALUATING THE USE OF PUBLIC
SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS FOR CRIME CONTROL AND PREVENTION—A SUMMARY 2 (2011).
80 Police Exec. Research Forum, How Are Innovations in Technology Transforming
Policing?, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES 13 (2012) [hereinafter PERF].
81 LEMAS 2007, supra note 2.
82 INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES FOR
PUBLIC SAFETY: IDENTIFYING CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY NEEDS 2-3 (2005) [hereinafter
IACP CRITICAL TECH. NEEDS].
83 Id. at 3.
84 LEMAS 2003, supra note 71; LEMAS 2007, supra note 2. It is unclear why
exactly the number of departments that use biometric technology has not increased
like other technologies.
85 IACP CRITICAL TECH. NEEDS, supra note 82, at 7 (noting that among the
categories of video cameras and biometric technologies, respondents placed fixed
surveillance cameras and facial recognition at the top of their relative priority lists).
86 See NICHOLS, supra note 72, at 13.
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to use ALPR in some capacity.87 While this initially suggests
that ALPR is relatively uncommon in the United States, the
breakdown of ALPR by city reveals that large cities commonly
employ ALPR. Approximately 48% of departments with over
1,000 sworn officers utilize ALPR, compared to 32% of
departments with between 501 and 1,000 officers, and 19% of
those with between 251 and 500 sworn employees.88 California,
New York, and Florida had the most agencies that claim to use
ALPR, with Texas, Virginia, Colorado, and Georgia not far
behind.89
Since the LEMAS data came out, three other surveys
have attempted to document the use of ALPR in American
police agencies. The IACP published the first of these postLEMAS studies in 2009 after surveying 444 law enforcement
departments in the United States. Of the 305 that responded,
23% reported using ALPR.90 Like LEMAS, the IACP designed
the survey to carefully consider the effect of police organization
size on ALPR adoption. Table 1 breaks down ALPR usage by
department size.
TABLE 1, 2007 LEMAS AND 2009 IACP REPORTED ALPR
USAGE BY DEPARTMENT SIZE91

The sample size of those responding to the IACP survey
was smaller than the LEMAS survey, which might partially
explain the variation. Nonetheless, the IACP numbers build a
compelling case that the usage of ALPR is increasing. In a
more recent study, Cynthia Lum, Linda Merola, Julie Willis,
87
88
89
90
91

ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 56, at 6; LEMAS 2007, supra note 2.
ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 56, at 6.
Id.
Id. at 19.
ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 56; LEMAS 2007, supra note 2.
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and Breanne Cave surveyed a random but statistically
representative sample of 200 police departments.92 Of the 169
departments that responded, Lum et al. found that 21% used
ALPR. 93 Among larger departments of 100 sworn officers or
more, the number increased to 37%.94 This generally comports
with the IACP and LEMAS findings. Like the IACP report,
Lum et al.’s study finds convincing evidence that ALPR usage
has increased since the 2007 LEMAS report, and that ALPR
usage depends in large part on department size.
The most recent research on the subject comes from a
2011 survey conducted by PERF. They found that 71% of
responding agencies currently use ALPR and 85% of
administrators plan to acquire more ALPR devices or increase
use in the future.95 Again, it is worth noting that the sample
size in the PERF survey was only 70 agencies—not quite as
large as the Lum et al. study and significantly smaller than
LEMAS. 96 The distribution of the PERF sample also skews
heavily toward large departments. 97 This possibly affects the
overall findings, and results in a disproportionately large
percentage of departments that report ALPR usage compared
to the other surveys. But even when accounting for the
somewhat skewed sample, the results are strong evidence that
departments have increased ALPR adoption in recent years.
Respondents to the PERF survey instrument also noted that
they expected to equip 25% of all squad cars in their
department with ALPR devices in the next five years.98
The LEMAS and PERF reports do not provide detailed
information on the exact number of ALPR systems deployed
per department, but media reports have uncovered detailed
information about the heavy distribution of ALPR devices in
some of America’s largest cities. The District of Columbia and
surrounding suburbs currently operate over 250 ALPR devices.99
LUM ET AL., supra note 34, at 13-14.
Id. at 19.
94 Id. at 18-19.
95 PERF, supra note 80, at 1-2.
96 POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, USE OF TECHNOLOGY IN POLICING:
THE CHIEF’S PERSPECTIVE 9 (2011) [hereinafter PERF CHIEF’S PERSPECTIVE], available
at http://www.policeforum.org/library/critical-issues-in-policing-series/perfpresentation.pdf.
97 Id. at 3. Further, the median size of the department using ALPR in the
PERF study was 336 sworn officers. ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 56, at 7. Thus,
the PERF sample size appears to be skewed toward large departments.
98 PERF CHIEF’S PERSPECTIVE, supra note 96, at 9.
99 Allison Klein & Josh White, License Plate Readers: A Useful Tool for Police
Comes with Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/license-plate-readers-a-useful-tool-for-policecomes-with-privacy-concerns/2011/11/18/gIQAuEApcN_story.html.
92
93
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The state of Maryland has installed around 300 devices
statewide.100 New York City had installed 238 by 2011.101 Dallas
plans to use somewhere between 48 to 68 systems in the near
future.102 This rapid proliferation was predictable. As early as
2005, a survey of law enforcement conducted by the IACP found
that police administrators rated ALPR as the highest priority
locational and global position technology for future
investment.103 Overall, the body of evidence on ALPR suggests
that the technology is becoming common in American law
enforcement agencies.
In sum, the data from these various sources generally
reveal two major trends about the adoption of digitally efficient
surveillance technology. First, digitally efficient surveillance
technologies are becoming ubiquitous among American police
departments—particularly in large, urban departments. Second,
this rapid transformation in policing technology has happened in
a relatively short period of time. This should come as no
surprise. Given the potential criminological and cost benefits of
digitally efficient surveillance technologies, departments should
be investing in these types of technologies. The next logical
question is whether and how departments have internally
regulated these technologies after adoption. The next section
will summarize the limited empirical work on the state of
internal departmental regulations.
C.

The State of Internal Departmental Regulations

The empirical evidence on the scope of the digitally
efficient investigative state paints a clear and persuasive
picture—digitally efficient technologies are becoming increasingly
common, particularly in large police departments. This means
that departments are often collecting enormous amounts of data
on a daily basis. Police agencies in Southern California, for
instance, have amassed over 160 million data points from the
use of ALPR alone. 104 Fundamental to the emergence of the
digitally efficient investigative state is the ability to retain
ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 56, at 28.
Al Baker, Camera Scans of Car Plates Are Reshaping Police Inquiries, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2011, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/nyregion/
12plates.html.
102 CITY OF DALL., TEX., REQUEST FOR COMPETITIVE SEALED PROPOSAL: DPD
MOBILE AND FIXED AUTOMATIC LICENSE PLATE RECOGNITION (ALPR) SYSTEM 2-4
(2012); ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 56, at 28.
103 IACP CRITICAL TECH. NEEDS, supra note 82, at 7.
104 Jon Campbell, License Plate Recognition Logs Our Lives Long Before We
Sin, L.A. WEEKLY (June 21, 2012), http://www.laweekly.com/2012-06-21/news/licenseplate-recognition-tracks-los-angeles/.
100
101
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large amounts of data due to improving technological feasibility
and decreased cost. 105 This means that law enforcement
agencies collect data on all recorded activity, not just
suspicious or criminal behavior.
Departments have every incentive to keep as much data
as possible, if that data could be useful in any way to a future
criminal investigation. But the possibility of unregulated data
retention on innocent people raises serious privacy concerns.106
Without regulation, historical and psychological evidence
indicates that unregulated surveillance data retention may
allow the state to target unpopular minority groups for
unjustified surveillance, increase the likelihood of corruption,
and facilitate fishing expeditions that could eventually disrupt
the lives of the innocent.107
New evidence suggests that departments have
implemented vastly different internal regulations on the use,
retention, and access to data acquired from digitally efficient
technologies. The overwhelming majority of departments use
these technologies not just for observational comparison, but
also indiscriminate data collection. Some departments keep
data for a matter of days, while others retain it indefinitely.
The BJS does not ask departments about data retention
policies in the LEMAS surveys. Thus, the best information on
data retention by American law enforcement comes from the
pair of studies done on ALPR and surveillance cameras by the
IACP in 2001 and 2009 respectively. According to these reports,
96% of departments using surveillance cameras, and 95% of
those using ALPR engage in some kind of indiscriminate data
collection—not just observational comparison.108
Among departments that take part in the practice of
indiscriminate data collection, the length of retention varies
widely. Among departments using surveillance cameras, the
vast majority retain video footage for over a month. 109 Of
course, the IACP completed this survey on surveillance
cameras over a decade ago, when long-term data storage was
less feasible. We may expect that today, departments can
affordably store video footage for even longer periods of time.
See supra Part I.A.
See Rushin, supra note 8, at 299-302.
107 Id.
108 NICHOLS, supra note 72, at 9 (defining observational comparison as the
presence of a formalized policy permitting no storage of data, according to figure 10);
ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 56, at 29 (defining observational comparison as the
presence of a formalized policing permitting no storage of data, according to table 18).
109 NICHOLS, supra note 72, at 9.
105
106
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Table 2 summarizes the IACP data on surveillance camera
data retention.
TABLE 2, 2001 IACP DATA ON SURVEILLANCE CAMERA
DATA RETENTION

The IACP also found that a significant number of
departments outsourced the operation of police surveillance
cameras, as well as the storage and maintenance of data.
Around 47% of all camera operators were found to be sworn
police officers.110 Furthermore, while surveillance camera data is
generally stored at police facilities, the responsibility for
maintenance, collection, and disposal of data falls to non-police
officers in 43% of departments.111
As for ALPR locational data, the typical department
retained data for between two and six months.112 But a very
substantial portion of police departments—around 28%—admit
to having either no policy limiting data retention, or having a
departmental policy that mandates indefinite retention. 113
Table 3 aggregates the IACP findings on ALPR data retention.

Id. at 8 (noting in figure 7 that only 53% of operators are police officers).
Id. (noting in figure 6 that only 57% of the departments have police manage
data, but noting in figure 9 that in 90% of agencies the data is stored at police facilities).
112 ROBERTS & CASANOVA, supra note 56, at 29. I define the typical
department as the median department responding to the survey. Although the data is
not broken down by case, we can surmise from table 18 that the median is somewhere
between two and six months.
113 Id.
110
111
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TABLE 3, 2009 IACP DATA ON ALPR DATA RETENTION

Civil rights advocates have also attempted to gather
more up-to-date information on data retention policies by filing
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests with departments
all across the country. The ACLU has led this charge by filing
587 requests in 38 states. 114 So far, the ACLU has received
responses from 293 departments. 115 Although the ACLU has
not yet released the full extent of their data, they have
observed that retention policies vary widely from one
jurisdiction to the next.116 Departments commonly keep data for
several years, with many departments keeping retained data
indefinitely when possible.117
While some departments have proactively established
internal policies to regulate the use of these technologies, many
have not. Further, internal policies on data access, retention, and
sharing differ dramatically from one department to the next.

114 Am. Civil Liberties Union, You Are Being Tracked: How License Plate
Readers are Being Used to Record Americans’ Movements (July 17, 2013),
https://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/you-are-being-tracked-how-license-platereaders-are-being-used-record.
115 Id. at 3.
116 Id. at 20.
117 Id.
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THE LAW OF POLICE SURVEILLANCE

Traditionally, courts have shied away from regulating
police surveillance in public spaces. This is because the courts
have operated under a set of jurisprudential assumptions of
police surveillance. These jurisprudential assumptions were
reasonable in the past because of the limited technological
efficiency of previous surveillance technologies. In Jones, the
Supreme Court had the opportunity to confront these
jurisprudential assumptions in light of modern technology. A
majority of the justices indicated that these jurisprudential
assumptions were increasingly unsupportable in today’s
digitally efficient world of policing. 118 But the Court did not
alter these doctrinal assumptions in any way, nor did they offer
much indication on how they may alter these assumptions in
the future. Thus, after the Jones decision, the law of police
surveillance today is as incoherent as ever.
I have previously argued that the digitally efficient
investigative state does not run afoul of the Fourth
Amendment, based on the presence of these jurisprudential
assumptions,119 but dicta in the concurrences of the Jones case
imply that these jurisprudential assumptions may not exist for
much longer. Even so, there is no clear indication how the
Court could establish a default rule that both narrowly limits
some uses of digitally efficient technologies without adversely
affecting other non-invasive, legitimate uses.
In this section, I evaluate the doctrinal basis for the
traditional
jurisprudential
assumptions
about
police
surveillance. I then spend considerable time analyzing the
dicta in the Jones case to predict how the Court may respond to
these technologies in the future. I conclude that, while the
Court will likely make some effort to rein in the digitally
efficient investigative state in the future, any regulation will be
limited in capacity. The regulation will almost certainly rely upon
an often-ineffective enforcement tool like the exclusionary rule.
Thus, even if the judiciary is institutionally capable of controlling
the digitally efficient investigative state, the legislature must also
take a proactive role in any future regulation.

118 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955-64 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring and Alito, J., concurring) (both concurrences finding support for a broad
doctrinal shift in the treatment of technological surveillance).
119 Rushin, supra note 8, at 309-13.
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The Fourth Amendment and Privacy

Almost all legal challenges to surveillance, including the
challenge levied in Jones, claim that government surveillance
amounts to an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The
Fourth Amendment does not bar all searches; instead it merely
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by
government agents.120 In judging whether a tactic qualifies as
an unreasonable search or seizure, the Court generally uses a
test originally developed in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in
Katz v. United States. 121 This test asks whether the action
violates a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.122 An act
violates a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy if the
person “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,”
and such an expectation of privacy is “one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”123
The Court grappled with the jurisprudence of police
surveillance for many decades before adopting the Katz
standard. In a 1928 case, Olmstead v. United States, federal
prohibition officers used an early version of a wiretap to listen
in on the conversation of a criminal suspect.124 The officers did
not obtain a warrant before using the device. 125 Using this
technology, law enforcement listened to the suspect’s
conversations for many months. 126 They then used the
conversations as evidence to justify an arrest and later
conviction. 127 The Court upheld this wireless wiretapping as
constitutional, arguing that the practice involved no physical
intrusion into the person’s home or seizure of tangible property.128
The Court compared phone lines to public highways, noting
that the phone lines “are not part of his house or office any
more than are the highways along which they are stretched.”129
Thus, after Olmstead, the Fourth Amendment did not protect
against technological surveillance unless the technology

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
122 Id.
123 Id.; See also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (applying
Justice Harlan’s two-prong test).
124 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456-57 (1928), overruled by Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967).
125 Id. at 442-43.
126 Id. at 457.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 466.
129 Id. at 465.
120
121
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somehow tangibly intruded in a protected place.130 The Court
honored this rigid view of the Fourth Amendment for nearly
four decades, permitting law enforcement to use other
surveillance technologies like detectaphones 131 and wiretaps
without a warrant.
The Court finally reversed track in 1967 in Katz v. United
States.132 There, police surreptitiously attached a listening device
to a public telephone booth and listened to the conversations of
a suspected gambler.133 Katz appealed his conviction by arguing
that the use of a listening device inside a phone booth violated
the Fourth Amendment.134 The Court agreed with Katz, finding
that the use of a warrantless wiretapping device on a public
phone violated the Fourth Amendment because the “Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places, from unreasonable
searches and seizures.” 135 Even though the police never
physically invaded Katz’s personal property, and even though
Katz was using a public phone booth, the Court concluded that
he had a reasonable expectation that his words would not be
“broadcast to the world.”136 Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz
set out a two-prong test to determine whether the action of a
state agent violates the bar on unreasonable searches and
seizures. According to Harlan, courts should ask (1) whether a
person exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy, and (2)
whether society is ready to recognize that subjective
expectation as reasonable.137 In later cases, including Jones, the
Court has relied on this test to determine whether a police
surveillance technology requires a warrant before use.
B.

The Jurisprudential Assumptions of Police Surveillance

In applying the Katz test to emerging surveillance
technologies the Court has relied on two important
jurisprudential assumptions: first, an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in anything they expose to the
public or a third party, and second, policing technologies that
130 Hutchins, supra note 12, at 424 (noting that Olmstead “recognized a new
constitutional threshold for Fourth Amendment protection—tangible physical intrusion
by the government”).
131 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135-36 (1942) (holding that the
use of a detectaphone to listen to a defendant’s conversation through an adjoining wall
did not require a warrant before use).
132 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
133 Id. at 354-55 n.14.
134 Id. at 348-49.
135 Rushin, supra note 8, at 305.
136 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
137 Id. at 361 (Harland, J., concurring).
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merely improve the efficiency of otherwise legal policing tactics
do not violate a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Each
of these assumptions was once defensible, but decreasingly so
in our technologically efficient state.
1. Assumption One: No Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy in Actions Exposed to Others
The first major assumption of police surveillance law is
that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
anything they expose to the public or a third party. Historically,
the Court has relied on this assumption as a fundamental
building block for numerous jurisprudential doctrines, including
the open fields doctrine, the third party doctrine, and the
misplaced trust doctrine. Today, this assumption grounds the
belief that police can observe and record all public behavior—
whether that surveillance comes in the form of aerial
observation,138 surveillance of driving movements,139 or through
the use of some other digitally efficient technology.
One of the earliest judicial default rules premised on
this presumption is the open fields doctrine.140 Established in
Hester v. United States 141 and later reaffirmed in Oliver v.
United States,142 this doctrine clarified that individuals have no
reasonable or constitutionally protected expectation of privacy
in open fields. For example, in Hester, two state agents
trespassed onto a criminal suspect’s land and observed him in
possession of illegal alcohol.143 The Court held that, even if the
officers had unlawfully trespassed onto the suspect’s land, the
subsequent observation of liquor was not an unreasonable
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 144 The agents
made these observations from an open field, and the Court held
that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
observations made from an open field.145 The Court reaffirmed
the open fields doctrine in 1984 in Oliver. There the justices
found that the open field doctrine does not conflict with the
two-prong test handed down in Katz.146 Individuals do not have
138 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476
U.S. 227 (1986).
139 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
140 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924).
141 Id. at 59.
142 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984).
143 Hester, 265 U.S. at 57-58.
144 Id. at 58-59.
145 Id.
146 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179.
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a reasonable expectation of privacy in actions executed in open
fields because they cannot reasonably expect that such actions
will be free from “government interference or surveillance.”147
Implicit in the open fields doctrine is a notion that
individuals should not expect privacy in such environments
because such locations are often visible to other people. Thus,
the open fields doctrine is premised upon a conception of privacy
that rigidly distinguishes between private and public. When
people make any action public through committing it in a
potentially public environment, such as an open field, they
thereby expose that behavior to the world. In such scenarios,
the Court has historically held that the person loses any
reasonable expectation of privacy.
The third-party doctrine also relies on a belief that all
information exposed to others deserves no protection under the
Fourth Amendment. In United States v. Miller, the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) acquired bank records
related to Miller’s alcohol distillery.148 The Court held that the
ATF did not need a warrant to obtain Miller’s bank records
because the records contained “only information voluntarily
conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the
ordinary course of business.” 149 Thus, Miller stands for the
proposition that, even when a person turns over records to a
third party for a limited purpose, he assumes the risk that the
third party will reveal those records to law enforcement.150 The
Court has since reaffirmed this rule in various different scenarios,
including in Smith v. Maryland. There, police installed a device
known as a pen register on a criminal suspect’s phone without a
warrant. 151 The pen register gave law enforcement a record of
every phone number the suspect dialed.152 The Court found this
kind of law enforcement tactic constitutional because it merely
recorded the numbers dialed, not the content of the
communications. While a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their communications over a telephone, they should
realize that a phone company has a legitimate business need to
record numbers dialed. 153 Thus, by using a telephone, users
should reasonably expect that a third party is or could be
compiling data on the numbers they dial.154 In such situations,
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

Id.
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437-39 (1976).
Id. at 442.
Id. at 443.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737, 745-46 (1979).
Id.
Id. at 743.
Id. at 745-46.
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“a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”155
The misplaced trust doctrine similarly rests on a
presumption that individuals risk observation and investigation
every time they reveal any words or behaviors to third parties.
Soon after Katz, the Court held in United States v. White that
police could legally record conversations between informants and
criminal suspects without a warrant; even if a person has every
reason to trust that the information shared will be private, he
cannot reasonably be certain that such information will stay
private. 156 Even if that suspect has a misplaced trust in the
informant, the suspect assumes the risk by conveying personal
information. This reaffirmed the Court’s holding from an
earlier case, Hoffa v. United States, that stated that “[t]he risk
of being overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an
informer or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one
deals is probably inherent in the conditions of human society.
It is the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we
speak.” 157 Whether you turn over bank records to a financial
assistant, 158 phone numbers to a phone company, 159 or
confidential information to a supposed friend, 160 you lose
virtually any reasonable expectation of privacy. Similarly, if
your actions end up being visible to other people, 161 even on
your own property, you cannot reasonably expect privacy.
The Court has continued to adhere to this jurisprudential
assumption in cases involving advanced technological
surveillance by law enforcement. Three of the most prominent
pre-Jones cases involving technologically advanced police
surveillance mechanisms, Florida v. Riley, 162 Dow Chemical
Company v. United States,163 and United States v. Knotts,164 all
appear to abide by this jurisprudential assumption.
The Riley case involved a police helicopter that flew
approximately 400 feet above a suspect’s greenhouse. 165 The
owner had partially enclosed the greenhouse and covered the

Id. at 743-44.
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-53 (1971).
157 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966) (quoting . Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963) (Warren, J., dissenting)).
158 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
159 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44.
160 Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 303.
161 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984).
162 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
163 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
164 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
165 Riley, 488 U.S. at 448-49.
155
156
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top of the greenhouse with corrugated roof panels.166 Some of
these panels were clear, some opaque.167 The owner had only
left about 10% of the roof uncovered by roofing panels.168 By
flying over this structure in a helicopter, a police officer could
visually identify marijuana growing inside the greenhouse.169
The Court ruled that, because the owner would reasonably
expect there to be air traffic over this greenhouse, he had to
reasonably expect that aircraft flying over the structure could
see inside. 170 Adhering to the first assumption of police
surveillance law, the Court rejected the suspect’s privacy claim
on the basis that he had implicitly made his marijuana farm
public to those flying above.
The Court reached a very similar conclusion in Dow
Chemical.171 In that case, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) used an aerial camera to photograph a manufacturing
facility in Midland, Michigan. 172 The aircraft never left
navigable airspace and took photographs from between 1,200
and 12,000 feet. 173 The camera allowed the EPA to gain an
extremely close-up look at details in the facility—“a great deal
more than the human eye could ever see.” 174 Even so, the
resultant pictures were not significantly distinguishable from
those used to make maps. 175 While Dow has a reasonable
expectation of privacy inside its building facilities, the Court
determined that the outside of the facility—particularly when
viewed from above—is more akin to an open field. 176 This
means that “observation of persons in aircraft lawfully in the
public airspace immediately above or sufficiently near the
area” does not offend the Fourth Amendment.177
Finally, in Knotts, the Court upheld the use of a
warrantless radio transmitter tracking device installed inside a
chemical drum purchased by a criminal suspect. Police believed
that the suspect was using certain chemicals in the production
of illegal substances. 178 With the permission of the chemical
company, police installed the tracking device on a chloroform
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
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container before the chemical company handed it over to the
suspect. 179 The officers then used a radio receiver to acquire
occasional signals emitted by the tracker; these signals helped
the officials generally follow the suspect, but did not reveal his
precise location in the way GPS can today.180 The officers used
this device to establish probable cause for a warrant.181 Upon
executing the warrant, police discovered that the suspect was
part of an extensive methamphetamine laboratory. 182 The
suspect challenged his conviction by claiming that the tracking
device violated his reasonable expectation of privacy. 183 The
Court rejected his claim, arguing that the suspect had a
diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile on a public
thoroughfare.184 The court reasoned that when a car travels in
public, “both its occupants and its contents are in plain view”;185
the suspect’s “direction[,] . . . stops . . . and . . . final destination”
were all “voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look.”186
Consequently, the Court upheld the admission of evidence
acquired via the tracking device.187
In sum, the Court has tightly honored the traditional
assumption that anything exposed to the public is presumptively
outside the bounds of Fourth Amendment protection. Such an
assumption has traditionally been workable given the limited
scope of investigative technologies. Surveillance technologies—
be they aerial photography or radio transmitters—could only
collect information on a limited number of suspects over a
limited period of time. Police were forced to choose which
suspects to surveil, thereby limiting the overall scope of public
surveillance efforts. As the digitally efficient investigative state
grows in strength, however, this assumption is becoming
dangerously unsupportable.
2. Assumption Two: The Courts Should Not Limit
Police Efficiency
The second major jurisprudential assumption of police
surveillance is that policing technologies that merely improve
the efficiency of otherwise legal policing tactics do not violate a
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
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Id. at 281.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. These efficiencyenhancing technologies are typically contrasted with
technologies that give police a pervasive, extrasensory ability.
The Court has long displayed a reluctance to regulate police
efficiency. As early as Dow Chemical, the Court was quick to
note that, although an aerial camera can get a very precise
view of images below, “[t]he photographs were not so revealing
of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns. The mere
fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to the
degree here, does not give rise to constitutional problems.”188
Indeed, the Court has long distinguished between senseenhancing technologies and extrasensory technologies.189 While
the Court has restricted the use of certain extrasensory
technologies, it has been reluctant to restrict any technologies
that merely improve the efficiency of otherwise legitimate
police surveillance techniques.
The United States v. Kyllo 190 case typifies the Court’s
approach to extrasensory technology, while the White 191 and
Knotts 192 cases are examples of the Court’s deference toward
efficiency-enhancing technologies. In Kyllo, law enforcement
officials suspected the defendant of growing marijuana in his
home by using high-intensity lamps.193 Police knew that such
high-intensity lamps would produce a significant amount of
heat.194 From the outside of the house, an officer used a heatsensing device to scan the inside of the defendant’s house.195
The device was capable of showing differences in heat within
the house. 196 The officer found that the home’s garage was
substantially warmer than the rest of the house, which was
consistent with the growing of marijuana via indoor heat
lamps.197 Based on this information, police obtained a warrant
to search the home and found marijuana inside the garage,
which was used to secure a conviction. 198 The defendant
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 228 (1986).
See generally Hutchins, supra note 12, at 433-38 (describing the difference
between sense-augmenting and extrasensory technologies); Nicholas J. Heydt,
Comment, The Fourth Amendment Heats Up: The Constitutionality of Thermal
Imaging and Sense-Enhancing Technology—Kyllo v. United States, 29 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 981, 993-94 (2003) (discussing sense-enhancing technologies).
190 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
191 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
192 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
193 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 29-30.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 30.
198 Id.
188
189
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challenged the unwarranted use of the heat sensor by claiming
that its use violated his reasonable expectation of privacy.199
The Court agreed, holding that this type of warrantless,
extrasensory surveillance violated the constitution because it
was capable of “explor[ing] the details of the home that would
previously have been unknowable without physical
intrusion . . . .”200 Justice Stevens, in attempting to justify the
warrantless use of this technology in his dissent, tried to
categorize heat sensors as an efficiency-enhancing technology:
“the ordinary use of the senses might enable a neighbor or
passerby to notice the heat emanating from a building . . . .”201
But the majority of the Court ultimately disagreed, finding the
use of a heat sensor without a warrant to be unconstitutionally
extrasensory in nature.202
This contrasts with the White and Knotts cases. In each
of those cases, the Court concluded that the police do not need
to acquire a warrant before using a technological replacement
for everyday police activity.203 In White, the Court noted that an
undercover officer does not violate a suspect’s reasonable
expectation of privacy by taking notes on the conversation.204
Thus, it should come as no surprise that the Court has
consistently held that police may engage in warrantless
recording of conversations while undercover. 205 As Justice
White persuasively argued:
If the conduct and revelations of an agent operating without electronic
equipment do not invade the defendant’s constitutionally justifiable
expectations of privacy, neither does a simultaneous recording of the
same conversations made by the agent or by others from
transmissions received from the agent to whom the defendant is
talking and whose trustworthiness the defendant necessarily risks.206

The Court made the same basic argument in the Knotts
case. There, the Court concluded that the warrantless use of a
tracking device was nothing more than a digital replacement
for traditional observational surveillance. 207 If police had
unlimited resources and officers, they could have conceivably
tracked the criminal suspect with the same accuracy. The
Id.
Id. at 40.
201 Id. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
202 Id. at 40 (majority opinion).
203 Hutchins, supra note 12, at 456 (discussing the difference between senseaugmenting technologies as replacements for police activity and extrasensory technologies).
204 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971).
205 See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 750-51 (1979).
206 White, 401 U.S. at 751.
207 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
199
200
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digital tracking device was nothing more than an efficiencyenhancing technology. As such, the justices upheld the
warrantless use of the technology because the court “never
equated police efficiency with unconstitutionality.”208
The Court, though, does not always rely upon a complete
dichotomy between efficiency-enhancing and extrasensory
technologies. The Court does permit the unwarranted use of
certain extrasensory technologies, depending on the quantity
and type of information revealed by the technology.209 The Dow
Chemical case epitomizes this exception to the rule. Recall that
when the state used aerial cameras to zoom into details on the
Dow Chemical facility below, the Court acknowledged that no
police officer could have seen images in such fine detail without
the assistance of the camera.210 This seems to suggest that the
technology was more akin to a heat sensor (extrasensory) than
an audio record recorder (efficiency-enhancer). But the Court
nonetheless permitted the warrantless use of this technology
because of the limited amount of private information it could
potentially uncover by photographing a business facility from
above.211 Because the only possible information that the aerial
photography could obtain was pictures of an open field, the
technology could only minimally invade any person’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.
This raises an important question—if a technology could
record, through extrasensory methods, evidence of illegal
behavior only, would police ever need to obtain a warrant to use
this technology? One emerging technology might raise this very
question. 212 The United States intelligence community has
made a substantial investment in laser-based molecular
scanners.213 The technology is up to ten million times faster and
a million times more sensitive than any other technology

Id. at 284.
See Hutchins, supra note 12, at 438.
210 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986).
211 Id. at 236-39 (noting the reduced expectation of privacy because the property
was more akin to an open field than the property immediately surrounding a home).
212 Maggie Fox, New Laser Spectrometer Provides Instant Analysis, REUTERS,
Feb. 7, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/07/us-laser-detectoridUSN0734345320080207 (explaining the possible future uses of laser spectrometers
that can detect and identify microscopic amounts of material on many feet away on
passing pedestrians).
213 John Roach, New Security Scanners to Reveal Everything About You,
Instantly, NBC NEWS (July 11, 2012, 1:39 PM), available at http://www.nbcnews.com/
technology/futureoftech/new-security-scanners-reveal-everything-about-you-instantly876156; Hidden Government Scanners Will Instantly Know Everything About You From
164 Feet Away, GIZMODO, (July 10, 2012), http://gizmodo.com/5923980/the-secretgovernment-laser-that-instantly-knows-everything-about-you.
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currently available.214 It can immediately ascertain everything
about a passing person—from small drug residue to gun
powder—from up to 50 meters away.215 Police can operate this
technology without passing pedestrians even knowing it is in
operation.216 Such a technology is undeniably extrasensory in
nature. No human could possibly detect the presence of illegal
substances on a molecular level. The technology could
theoretically be calibrated to uncover only the presence of illegal
substances. The Court has generally held that the use of an
extrasensory aid, like a canine, that should only alert officers to
the presence of an illegal drug does not require a warrant, or
even reasonable suspicion before use.217 But the widespread use
of a technology like laser-based molecular scanners could
someday force the Court to rethink this conclusion.218
To summarize, while the Court has generally upheld the
assumption that police may freely use efficiency-enhancing
technologies, police must obtain authorization before turning to
extrasensory technology. They have tempered this dichotomy in
cases where the extrasensory aid can only alert police to the likely
presence of illegal behavior. But that assumption may become
more and more unjustified in light of technological advancement.
C.

Jones and the Emerging Doctrinal Incoherence

Before Jones, the Court had relied on these two
jurisprudential assumptions of police surveillance. But Jones
forced the Court to consider how these assumptions fit with the
increasingly efficient, digital surveillance of the twenty-first
century. It is worth mentioning at the outset that the technology
at issue in Jones is distinguishable from the digitally efficient
investigative technologies discussed in this article. The law
enforcement agency used the GPS device in Jones to only
monitor the movements of a single criminal suspect. While the
device could efficiently monitor the movements of a single person, it
was not part of a dragnet surveillance technique that collected
214 Hidden Government Scanners Will Instantly Know Everything About You
From 164 Feet Away, supra note 213.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405
(2005); but see Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (holding that a canine sniff
on a person’s home or curtilage is a Fourth Amendment search).
218 The ability of laser-based molecular scanners to detect any substance on a
molecular level makes it many magnitudes more efficient than a traditional, extrasensory
aid like a canine. Thus, this could raise the same legal and pragmatic concerns expressed
supra Part I.A regarding unregulated efficiency.
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surveillance data on the entire community.219 Thus, it is hard to
predict how the Court will eventually handle the digitally efficient
investigative state based solely on their treatment of GPS devices.
Even so, the Jones decision gave the Court a clear opportunity to
directly confront the jurisprudential assumptions of police
surveillance.
In the case, police suspected that nightclub owner and
operator Antoine Jones was trafficking narcotics.220 The Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the D.C. Metropolitan Police
Department used a variety of investigation techniques,
including the installation of a surveillance camera, pen
registers, and a wiretap of Jones’s cell phone. 221 Based on
potentially incriminating information obtained through these
measures, law enforcement successfully acquired a warrant to
install a GPS device on Jones’s Jeep Cherokee.222 The warrant
only authorized law enforcement to install the device within a
10-day time period while the automobile was in Washington,
D.C.223 Rather than following the terms of the warrant, police
installed the device “[o]n the 11th day, and not in the District
of Columbia but in Maryland . . . .”224 Thus, while the police had
initially obtained a warrant for the GPS device, the warrant
was no longer valid at the time of installation. Police installed
the device by attaching it to the underside of the Jeep while it
was parked in a public lot.225
Over the next 28 days, police tracked the movement of
Jones’s automobile.226 The police even replaced the battery on
the GPS device at one point while the car was again in a public
parking lot in Maryland. 227 Because the GPS device was only
affixed to Jones’s car, the police could only monitor the movement
of his car along public thoroughfares.228 Still, the police acquired
over 2,000 pages of data during this time period, some of which
helped build the government’s case against Jones and his coconspirators for conspiracy to distribute and possession with the
intent to distribute cocaine.229 Jones challenged the admission
of the GPS data in the District Court. But the court permitted
See Rushin, supra note 8, at 317.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
221 Id.
222 Id. It is worth noting that the car in question actually belonged to Jones’s
wife, although Jones used the vehicle.
223 Id.
224 Id.
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226 Id.
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229 Id.
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nearly all of this data into evidence, citing Knotts for the
proposition that an individual has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in public movements. 230 The district court jury found
Jones guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment.231
In a fascinating decision though, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia overturned the
conviction, ruling that the installation and data collection
violated the Fourth Amendment. 232 The D.C. Circuit reached
this conclusion by centering their analysis on whether a person
has a reasonable expectation that their movements will not be
recorded in an extended, uninterrupted manner.233 Because the
marginal cost of every day GPS surveillance is “effectively zero,”
police could monitor a person’s movement cheaply and incredibly
efficiently. 234 In applying a so-called “mosaic theory,” the court
noted that “long-term surveillance of an individual reveals
important and intimate details about their behaviors.” 235 The
court therefore concluded that police should obtain a valid
warrant before using technology that can reveal such intimate
and private details of one’s life.236
This was a radical doctrinal shift that fundamentally
undermined both of the jurisprudential assumptions of police
surveillance. By finding that the recording of personal
surveillance data on public movement at some point violates the
Fourth Amendment, the D.C. Circuit indicated that it presumably
believes that a person can have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in public. This undermines the first assumption of police
surveillance law, which says that people have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in public. The second jurisprudential
assumption of police surveillance, that the courts should not limit
improvements on policing efficiency, is likewise upended if a
technology like GPS can become unconstitutionally invasive based
merely on its ability to enhance the efficiency of surveillance.
The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with the D.C.
Circuit that the installation of a GPS device violated the
Fourth Amendment. The Court, though, split on why this kind
of surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment. Five of the
justices—Justice Scalia writing the majority with Justices
Thomas, Roberts, Sotomayor, and Kennedy joining—held that
Id.
Id. at 949.
232 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff ’ d, United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012).
233 Id. at 563-64.
234 Id. at 565.
235 Rushin, supra note 8, at 317.
236 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562-66.
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the installation of a GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment
because of the device’s physical installation on the automobile.237
These justices were not yet prepared to uphold the mosaic theory
advanced by the D.C. Circuit. Instead, they emphasized that,
because the attachment of the GPS device amounted to a
technical trespass, it violated the original understanding of the
Fourth Amendment.238 The majority did not discount, though,
that the Court might have to reconsider some of the basic
jurisprudential assumptions of police surveillance law. Scalia
cited Knotts in explaining that GPS is a mere technological
replacement for traditional surveillance, which has always been
upheld as constitutionally permissible without a warrant. 239
Scalia noted that, while “[i]t may be that achieving the same
results through electronic means, without any accompanying
trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy,” the Jones
case “[did] not require [the Court] to answer that question.”240
The Court has never recognized that long-term surveillance
amounts to an unconstitutional search, and the majority
argued that attempting to do so now would force the court to
unnecessarily grapple with many “vexing problems.”241
Justice Sotomayor wrote separately to note that long-term
and efficient technological surveillance might impinge on a
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.242 Sotomayor concluded
that “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information
voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”243 Nevertheless, Sotomayor
felt that this police action could be found unconstitutional based on
the trespass of personal property alone.244 By contrast, four of the
justices—Justice Alito writing the concurring opinion with
Justices Kagan, Breyer, and Ginsburg joining—concluded that
the installation of a GPS device violated the suspect’s
reasonable expectation of privacy by aggregating copious
amounts of data on his public actions.245 These justices believed
that the majority’s focus on the physical trespass of the device
was reminiscent of the Olmstead era decisions that emphasized
physical trespass as a necessity to any claim of unreasonable
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
Id.
239 Id. at 953.
240 Id. at 954.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
243 Id. at 957.
244 Id. at 955 (noting that the reaffirmation of the trespass principle was
sufficient to decide this case).
245 Id. at 963-64 (Alito, J., concurring).
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search and seizure.246 According to Justice Alito, the majority’s
reasoning generally ignores the important privacy interests at
stake in the long-term use of GPS tracking, and instead
“attaches great significance to something that most would view
as relatively minor”—the attachment of a small device to the
bottom of a car. 247 Such a viewpoint makes no distinction
between the use of GPS tracking for a single day or many
years. 248 In Alito’s mind, there is clearly a distinction to be
made between brief electronic surveillance and extended
surveillance;
long-term
surveillance
reveals
detailed
information about personal behavior and habits, while shortterm does not. But above all, Alito’s concurrence appears to
express concern that the majority’s rationale does nothing to
address electronic surveillance that does not involve physical
trespass.249
Alito believes that the Court should look at surveillance
techniques on a case-by-case basis and judge whether the
electronic surveillance used “involved a degree of intrusion that
a reasonable person would not have anticipated.”250 Using this
test, Alito would permit the short-term use of electronic
surveillance on public streets, but bar the use of long-term
surveillance for most criminal offenses. 251 “For such offenses,
society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and
others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—
secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an
individual’s car for a very long period.”252
The Alito recommendation is similar to the proposal I
made two years ago.253 His solution would involve the judiciary
limiting the length of data retention for surveillance
technologies. He would permit longer retention in cases where
police are investigating serious criminal offenses. And he
emphasizes that the legislature may be the most appropriate
branch to regulate these technologies long-term. Similarly, I
argued that the judiciary should regulate the digitally efficient
investigative state by limiting the length of data retention.254 I
Id. at 959.
Id. at 961.
248 Id. (noting that the “Court’s approach leads to incongruous results”
because it would make no distinction between use of the GPS device for “a brief time”
or a “much longer period [of time]”).
249 Id. at 962.
250 Id. at 964.
251 Id.
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emphasized the need for the judiciary to not establish a firm
limit on data retention and surveillance, thereby giving police
latitude to adjust the use of these technologies to the relative
seriousness of the crime being investigated and the relative
threat posed by the suspected criminal offense.255 I concluded
that the “legislatures must play a critical role in developing
more nuanced and specific enactments” that elaborate specific
regulations for the use of surveillance technology.256 Both my
recommended solution and Alito’s represent a limited
acceptance of the so-called mosaic theory that recognizes that
the aggregation of long-term electronic surveillance data can be
so revealing of personal details as to become an unreasonable
search or seizure.
After the Jones decision, it seems likely that the Court
will someday break away from the two jurisprudential
assumptions of mass police surveillance. At least five of the
justices showed clear support for the adoption of some version
of the mosaic theory. And even the justices that did not
officially support the future adoption of such a doctrinal path
acknowledged that it might be necessary in the future. But,
this raises two important questions—how should we begin to
regulate the use of these surveillance devices, and what branch
of government should do the regulating?
Scholars are sharply divided on the appropriateness of
judicially regulating emerging technologies. Orin Kerr has been
perhaps the most outspoken and persuasive critic of judicial
policymaking in such cases. Kerr has advanced three important
arguments in support of this position: (1) the courts lack the
physical and administrative resources to develop comprehensive
policies, (2) judges are not technologically sophisticated enough
to craft technology regulations, and (3) these judicial regulations
rarely hold up in different factual situations.257 After the Jones
decision, Kerr also argued that if the Court were to adopt the
mosaic theory, it would necessarily have to confront many

255 Id. at 321 (suggesting that “we may prefer more liberal data retention
policies for surveillance around national monuments and critical infrastructures in
recognition of the threat posed by terrorism”).
256 Id. at 328.
257 Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 857-88 (2004).
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extremely difficult choices. 258 Thus, Kerr believes that the
Court should avoid such a path in the future.259
I disagree with Kerr’s conclusions on the limited
institutional capacity of the judiciary to regulate emerging
surveillance technology. But even if the Court does eventually
adopt some version of the mosaic theory—as I believe they will—
this judicial response will be very limited. Thereafter, state
legislatures will ultimately have to develop most nuanced
regulations of these devices going forward.260 In the next section,
I develop a model state statute that could address some of the
major problems implicated by the digitally efficient state.
III.

THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE

Any future judicial response must be coupled with state
legislation. Even if the judiciary eventually accepts some
version of the mosaic theory in interpreting the Fourth
Amendment, we should not expect the Court to hand down
detailed regulations for the use of these technologies. Justice
Alito’s concurrence in Jones is telling. His proposal to regulate
the efficiency of surveillance technologies would only control
data retention. 261 And the amount of data that a police
department could reasonably retain without a warrant would
vary from one situation to the next based upon the relative
seriousness of the possible crime at issue. 262 This barely
scratches the surface of broader problems posed by the digitally
efficient state. Under what conditions should we permit
extensive data retention? When should we limit this kind of
retention? Is data aggregation more acceptable as long as the
data is not cross-referenced with other databases, thereby
personally identifying individuals? Should we regulate law
enforcement’s access to this personal data? And where should
this data be stored?
Even my original proposal for judicial regulation of
mass police surveillance only addressed a handful of these
questions. I recommended that courts require police to develop
clear data retention policies that are tailored to only retain
data as long as necessary to serve a legitimate law enforcement
258 See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment,
111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012).
259 Id. at 315-16 (pushing instead for the Court to adopt a sequential analysis
of search and seizure law, where the Court “take[s] a snapshot of the act and assess[es]
it in isolation”).
260 Id. at 328.
261 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
262 Id.
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purpose.263 Like Alito’s proposal, such a standard would vary
according to the seriousness of the crime under investigation
and the individual circumstance. I also argued that in cases
where police retain surveillance data without a warrant
through electronic means, they should have a legitimate law
enforcement purpose before cross-referencing that data with
other databases for the purposes of identifying individuals.264
Both the Jones concurrence and my previous proposal
would establish a broad judicial principle mandating that
police regulate data retention according to the seriousness of
the crime under investigation and the legitimate need for such
retention. This type of judicial response is limited in nature.
Legislative bodies would likely need to step in to provide more
detailed standards.
The legislative branch has several advantages over the
judiciary that make it appropriate for this type of detailed policy
building. The legislature has a wider range of enforcement
mechanisms than the judiciary. The legislature can mandate indepth and regular oversight. And it has the resources and tools
to develop extensive, complex regulations. As a result, the
legislature is the best-positioned branch to address some of the
critical issues raised by the digitally efficient investigative
state, such as data storage, access, and sharing policies.
In this Part, I offer guidelines for a legislative response
to mass police surveillance. I first detail some of the
foundational principles that legislative bodies ought to recognize
in regulating police use of technology. Next, I give a brief
overview of how a handful of states have attempted to regulate
these technologies. I conclude by offering and defending my
statutory recommendations.
A.

Foundational Principles for Regulating Police
Surveillance Technology

In making this legislative recommendation, I rely on
three foundational principles about legislative regulation of law
enforcement technologies. First, any regulation must provide
clear and articulable standards that law enforcement can and
will easily enforce.265 Courts and legislators have often agreed
Rushin, supra note 8, at 318.
Id.
265 David Goetz, Locating Location Privacy, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 823, 856
(2011); Pell & Soghoian, supra note 23, at 124 (explaining the importance of clear rules
for law enforcement); Savage, supra note 23, at A12 (quoting Professor Kerr advocating
clear standards for law enforcement).
263
264
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that police regulations should be easy to apply across many
different factual circumstances. 266 If a regulation is unclear,
there is a higher probability that law enforcement will, even in
good faith, misapply the standard. For example, in Atwater v.
City of Lago Vista, Texas state law permitted officers to arrest
offenders who violated traffic laws for failure to wear a
seatbelt, even though the final punishment for such a violation
was a mere fine.267 In upholding an officer’s decision to arrest a
woman for failure to buckle her seatbelt, the Court stressed
that police need rules that emphasize “clarity and simplicity.”268
Earlier regulations have encountered resistance from
law enforcement because they were not easily administrable
standards. For example, in Arizona v. Gant, the Court upended
a longstanding doctrine that said police could search an
automobile incident to an arrest of a person in that vehicle.269
The new standard said that police “may search a vehicle
incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is
within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the
time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle
contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”270 Justice Alito found
this new standard undesirable compared to the previous
standard. In Alito’s mind, the Court should strive for “a test that
would be relatively easy for police officers and judges to
apply.”271 While some commentators disagree about the relative
importance of clear and simple rules, 272 most judges and
policymakers agree that any policymaker should consider the
administrability of a mandate.
Clear and simple rules also have another advantage
over ambiguous mandates—these kinds of clear directives are
less susceptible to organizational mediation. 273 If a state
regulation of a policing organization is “vague or ambiguous,”
the police organization may “mediate the implementation and
impact the law.” 274 Lauren Edelman had demonstrated this
266 See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 360 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(noting that courts and policymakers should strive to develop “a test that would be
relatively easy for police officers and judges to apply”).
267 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001).
268 Id. at 347.
269 Gant, 556 U.S. at 351.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 360 (Alito, J., dissenting).
272 See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137,
2182 (2002) (claiming that police may actually be better at applying vague rules,
contrary to the majority of all comments by courts and commentators).
273 Stephen Rushin, The Regulation of Private Police, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 159,
198-99 (2012).
274 Id.
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type of mediation in the case of equal employment and
affirmative action laws that are intended to change the
behavior of private organizations. 275 These initial laws only
established broad regulatory goals without offering clear and
explicit procedural limitations. 276 This type of ambiguous
mandate gave private companies room to interpret the laws
and construct the meaning of compliance, thereby mediating
“the impact of the law on society.”277
In the past, the police have been guilty of organizational
mediation of a variety of legal mandates. The general police
response to Miranda is particularly demonstrative of this
phenomenon. Scholars like Richard Leo and Charles Weisselberg
have carefully shown how police have navigated around the
limitations of the original Miranda decision to nonetheless engage
in seemingly coercive interrogation techniques aimed at acquiring
information. 278 The original Miranda opinion provided some
limitations on interrogations, but the decision and subsequent
holdings may have been ambiguous, thereby allowing for
departments to navigate around them without technically
violating the law. Thus, in crafting rules for police, both the
Court and legislatures should aim to create easily administrable
law enforcement rules if at all possible, but also laws that are
specific enough to avoid organizational mediation.
Second, communities differ in their need for public
surveillance. For example, New York City and Washington,
D.C. have previously been targets for international terrorism.
Given their plethora of high value targets and landmarks,
these two cities may have a legitimate need for more public
surveillance than other communities.279 In arguing for a malleable
standard for local departments, the IACP has suggested that
some locations—namely bridges, critical infrastructure, and other
high value targets—demand more surveillance and data retention
to ensure public safety.280 As an example, the IACP cites the
fact that locations targeted on September 11, 2001 were part of
a terrorist attack that took many years to plan and execute.281
275 See generally Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic
Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531 (1992).
276 Id. at 1532-33.
277 Id. at 1532.
278 See generally Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L.
REV. 1519 (2008); Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 266 (1996).
279 See Rushin, supra note 8, at 321.
280 Id.
281 INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT
FOR THE UTILIZATION OF LICENSE PLATE READERS 40 n.70 (Sept. 2009) [hereinafter IACP
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Thus, certain communities may legitimately need and prefer
longer retention periods around certain important targets.
Conversely, a medium-sized suburb with low crime that places
a higher value on privacy might prefer a bar on the retention of
surveillance data all together. While any state statute should
establish minimally acceptable requirements on data retention,
the law must be sufficiently broad to permit necessary variation
at the local level. A one-size-fits-all approach may not be
workable, given the unique law enforcement needs of each city.
Third, any regulation must clearly articulate the narrow
scope of technologies and devices that fall under its regulatory
purview. Because technology changes rapidly, this ensures that
the law will not be misapplied to future, emerging technologies.
Kerr has previously argued that regulations of technology
ought to proceed cautiously until the technology has stabilized.282
Technology may have unforeseen uses that will take time to
develop and understand. For example, in 1988, Congress passed
the Video Privacy Protection Act.283 This law protected the privacy
of videotape rental information.284 Congress passed the law after
Judge Robert Bork’s video rental history became public during his
Supreme Court nomination process. 285 But in crafting this
limitation on video rentals, Congress defined the term “video tape
service provider” expansively as “any person, engaged in the
business . . . of rental, sale, or delivery of prerecorded video
cassette tapes or similar audio visual material.”286
On one hand, this expansive definition of a videotape
service provider is useful because it is broad enough to avoid
antiquation. As videotape technology waned in popularity and
DVDs became the chosen medium for most movie rental
providers, the law maintained its statutory force. But the
vague language used by the original drafters of the law left
online streaming content providers like Netflix wondering
whether the law actually applied to their services.287 It was also
unclear what kind of approval Netflix and other providers had
PRIVACY ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.theiacp.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=
N%2bE2wvY %2f1QU%3d&tabid=87.
282 Kerr, supra note 258, at 805.
283 Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012), amended by
Video Privacy Protection Act Amendment Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-258 (2013).
284 Id.
285 Brendan Sasso, Obama Signs Bill to Let Facebook Users Share Netflix
Videos, HILL (Jan. 10, 2013, 2:31 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/
technology/276557-obama-signs-bill-to-let-facebook-users-share-netflix-videos.
286 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(4).
287 Julianne Pepitone, New Video Law Lets You Share Your Netflix Viewing on
Facebook, CNN MONEY (Jan. 10, 2013 9:50 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/01/10/
technology/social/netflix-vppa-facebook/.
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to obtain to allow users to share their viewing history on social
media platforms like Facebook. 288 After years of ambiguity,
Congress recently amended the law to permit users to share
content watching habits on streaming sites like Netflix after
they have given one-time approval.289
Before the law change, Netflix complained that the law’s
language was confusing, making them hesitant to adopt social
media integration.290 Similarly, when regulating police technology
use, legislative bodies should adopt language that is sufficiently
broad to avoid immediate antiquation. They should also be careful
not to select language that is so overly broad as to limit the use
of new, potentially important technological tools.
The legislative recommendation I make in this Part
attempts to follow these three guiding principles: it attempts to
(1) clearly define the limited scope of the applicable technologies,
(2) be clear and simple for law enforcement to administer, and (3)
permit some level of local variation to meet the needs of unique
municipalities. My starting point for crafting this model was to
analyze the small number of statutes already passed by state
legislators. The next section looks at these statutes to
demonstrate common trends.
B.

Current State Regulations

A handful of states have laid out regulations of the
digitally efficient investigative state. These state laws operate
by either regulating ALPR and surveillance cameras specifically,
or by establishing broad standards for data retention. For
example, states like Virginia have passed relatively broad laws
that regulate the retention of data by the government in all
forms. 291 In other states, like New Jersey, the state attorney
general has used state constitutional authority to hand down
directives regulating the use of ALPR and establishing
limitations on data collection.292 States like Maine, Arkansas,
New Hampshire, Vermont, and Utah have regulated ALPR
through legislative measures. 293 Some states, like New York,
have also handed down suggested model guidelines to inform
Id.
Id.
290 Id.
291 VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3800 (West 2010).
292 State of N.J., Office of the Attorney Gen., Directive No. 2010-5 (Dec. 3,
2010), reprinted in ROBERTS &CASANOVA, supra note 56, at 73.
293 ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1802 to 1808 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. 29-A, § 2117A (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 236:130 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-2001 to 2006
(2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1607 (2013).
288
289
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internal policymakers. 294 In this section, I demonstrate that
most of these early efforts to regulate the digitally efficient
surveillance technologies share a handful of common concerns.
They limit the identification of personal data, the length of
data retention, the sharing of information with other
departments, and law enforcement access to stored data. These
early models also rely on a bevy of enforcement mechanisms.
Thus, any model legislation aimed at holistically managing the
digitally efficient investigative state should consider the
possible solutions offered by existing laws.
First, the laws generally limit the length of data
retention in some way. Maine’s law on ALPR limits retention to
21 days. 295 New Hampshire also puts a strict limit on the
collection of law enforcement data, barring “retention of
surveillance data except for a few, specific situations.” 296 By
stark contrast, the New Jersey Attorney General has ordered
that data be retained for no more than five years. 297 Model
guidelines like those offered by the State of New York do not
establish a maximum length of data retention,298 but the New
York recommendations do encourage departments to establish
a clear policy on the length of data retention.299 Arkansas limits
retention to 150 days,300 Utah allows retention by government
agents for nine months,301 and Vermont permits retention for
up to 18 months.302 Each of these statutes reaches a different
conclusion on the appropriate length of data retention. The
disparity between the New Jersey data retention limit of five
years and relatively strict retention limits in states like Maine
and New Hampshire is striking. But the Maine law might not
be as restrictive as it initially appears. Although it does limit
retention in most cases to 21 days, it also makes an exception
for cases where law enforcement is engaged in an ongoing
investigation or intelligence operation. 303 Overall, state
legislatures have reached dramatically different conclusions on
the relative threat posed by long-term data retention.

294 N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIM. JUST. SERVS., SUGGESTED GUIDELINES:
OPERATION OF LICENSE PLATE READER TECHNOLOGY (Jan. 2011), reprinted in ROBERTS
& CASANOVA, supra note 56, at 94.
295 ME. REV. STAT. 29-A, § 2117-A(5).
296 Rushin, supra note 8, at 319 (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §236:130 (2011)).
297 State of N.J., supra note 292, at 9.
298 N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIM. JUST. SERVS., supra note 294, at 16-17.
299 Id.
300 ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1805 (2013).
301 UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-2004 (2013).
302 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1607(d)(2) (2013).
303 ME. REV. STAT. 29-A, § 2117-A(5) (2009).
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Second, a few of the available laws demonstrate a
concern for the identification of personal data collected by the
state. The New Jersey Attorney General Directive intends in
part to limit the “disclos[ure] [of] personal identifying
information about an individual unless there is a legitimate
and documented law enforcement reason for disclosing such
personal information to a law enforcement officer or civilian
crime analyst.”304 In New York, the model guidelines would also
require that officers attempting to query stored data for
identifying matches have a legitimate law enforcement purpose
for doing so, and that they record their identification
procedure. 305 Neither Maine nor New Hampshire has a
substantial policy on the identification of data, likely due in
large part to their strict limitations on retention.306 The longer a
state legislature permits data retention, the more legitimately
concerned it may be about the possibility of this data becoming
personally identified. After all, the combination of long-scale
retention and data identification procedures may allow law
enforcement to create “digital dossiers” on innocent people that
reveal private information about their habits, preferences, and
daily movements.307
Third, the available laws and recommended models tend
to put restrictions on the sharing of information with other
agencies. The New Jersey directive permits the sharing of
ALPR data among police departments in the state, provided
that the departments keep records of the data being shared
and all departments involved abide by the New Jersey rules.308
Nonetheless, New Jersey uses regulations on sharing as a way
to encourage the development of a consistent and organized
state database.309 The Utah law permits sharing and disclosure
only under narrow circumstances. 310 Arkansas, by contrast,
strictly prohibits sharing of collected data.311 Other states, like
New York, have been relatively hands-off when it comes to data
sharing. They simply urge departments to build procedures for
sharing data that are consistent with their overall
recommendations on data protection.312 We may expect states
State of N.J., supra note 292, at 1.
N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIM. JUST. SERVS., supra note 294, at 16-17.
306 ME. REV. STAT. 29-A, § 2117-A; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 236:130 (2011).
307 Rushin, supra note 8, at 318 (citing Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossier and
the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (2002)).
308 State of N.J., supra note 292, at 13-14.
309 Id.
310 UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-2004 (2013).
311 ARK. CODE ANN, § 12-12-1804 (2013).
312 N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIM. JUST. SERVS., supra note 294, at 17.
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to want to encourage departments to share whatever data they
can legally retain. By doing so, departments can have access to
significantly more information on the potential whereabouts of
criminal suspects who travel outside jurisdictional lines.313
Fourth, available and model rules document and limit
access to stored data. New Jersey’s regulation requires
departments to record all user access to stored ALPR data,
including the name of the user accessing the data, the time and
date of the access, whether the person used automated
software to analyze the data, and the name of the supervisor
who authorized the access.314 New York’s model guidelines also
suggest that departments document when officers search and
analyze stored data.315 Officers should also only analyze data if
they have a legitimate law enforcement purpose for doing so.316
Additionally, the Maine provision stresses the importance of
confidentiality in stored data.317 That law restricts access to law
enforcement officers. 318 And in Vermont, the law explicitly
states that access to stored data should be limited to specified
or previously designated personnel.319 Thus, the current array
of statutes acknowledges the need for limited access to
available data and confidentiality of stored information.
Fifth, some of the model regulations require
departments to train employees in the proper procedures for
handling data. They also discipline employees who fail to follow
policy parameters. The New York suggested guidelines
recommend that departments establish a list of designated
personnel who are authorized to access ALPR data, 320 and
encourage departments to establish a training program to
teach officers about the proper use of ALPR technology.321 The
New Jersey directive also requires that departments “designate
all authorized users, and that no officer or civilian employee
will be authorized to operate an ALPR, or to access or use
ALPR stored data, unless the officer or civilian employee has
received training by the department on the proper operation of
these devices.” 322 Once more, the New Jersey directive
mandates that “any sworn officer or civilian employee of the
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322

Rushin, supra note 8, at 292-93.
State of N.J., supra note 292, at 6-7.
N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIM. JUST. SERVS., supra note 294, at 16-17.
Id. at 16.
ME. REV. STAT. 29-A, § 2117-A(4) (2009).
Id.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1607(c)(1)(C)(ii) (2013).
N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIM. JUST. SERVS., supra note 294, at 15.
Id.
State of N.J., supra note 292, at 14-15.
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agency who knowingly violates the agency’s policy, or these
Guidelines, shall be subject to discipline.”323 Conversely, neither
the Maine nor New Hampshire laws touch on officers’ training
in data retention. 324 But this is likely because they do not
permit significant data accumulation, thereby making training
in data management less imperative. On the whole, those
states and entities that do permit large-scale data collection
also encourage officer training as a safeguard against abuse.
Sixth, the current array of regulations uses a wide
range of enforcement mechanisms. In New Jersey, as a penalty
for non-compliance, the Attorney General maintains the
authority to temporarily or permanently revoke a department’s
right to use ALPR devices. 325 Arkansas provides for civil
remedies for individuals when a violation of the law causes
them actual harm.326 Utah, by contrast, simply makes violation
of the statute a criminal misdemeanor. 327 Both the New
Hampshire and the Maine laws have made the violation of
ALPR regulations a criminal act in the state.328 Although New
York’s regulations are non-mandatory, they still recommend
that departments begin creating records in case the state
someday begins to audit data access and retention records.329
In sum, current state statutes and recommended
guidelines address a number of concerns related to the digitally
efficient state. It is worth noting again that these laws go far
beyond anything the judiciary would likely implement. The
Supreme Court is institutionally limited in its capacity to
develop a response to the digitally efficient investigative state.
The variation on the mosaic theory adopted by Alito in his
Jones concurrence would only establish a broad principle that longterm data retention by efficient public surveillance technologies
may eventually violate a person’s reasonable expectation of
privacy. Such a rule is ambiguous and does not touch on data
storage, access, and identification. State legislation offers the
possibility of establishing detailed and definitive standards.

323
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Id. at 15.
ME. REV. STAT. 29-A, § 2117-A (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 236:130 (2011).
State of New Jersey, supra note 292, at 16.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1807 (2013).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-2006 (2013).
ME. REV. STAT. 29-A, § 2117-A(6); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 236:130(V) (2009).
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Model Statute to Regulate Police Surveillance

The presently available statutes and model guidelines
suggest a key set of concerns that any future state legislative
body must consider. They demonstrate five common regulatory
needs: data retention, identification, access, sharing, and
training. The model statutory language I offer includes a
possible solution for each of these areas. In doing so, I also try
to honor the foundational principles for the regulation of police
surveillance identified above. The model statute provides a
clear standard that law enforcement agencies can implement.
It attempts to give departments some latitude to alter their
own policies to meet local needs. But the law also includes
specific and detailed regulations in hopes of preventing
organizational mediation.
The proposed statute also includes multiple enforcement
mechanisms to ensure compliance. The model excludes from
criminal court any evidence obtained in violation of this statute,
thus removing the incentive for police departments to violate the
policy. Of course, evidentiary exclusion is “limited as a means for
promoting institutional change” because it is filled with
exceptions and is narrower than the scope of police misconduct.330
Thus, I propose two additional enforcement mechanisms. First,
the model statute gives the state attorney general authority to
initiate litigation against departments that fail to comply with
these mandates. Other statutes regulating police misconduct, like
42 U.S.C. § 14141, have used a similar mechanism.331 Second, the
model mandates periodic state audits of departmental policies
and data records to ensure compliance. Overall, the proposed law
broadly addresses many of the problems implicit in the digitally
efficient state and establishes a number of enforcement
mechanisms to ensure organizational compliance.
1. Applicability, Definitions, and Scope
The first part of the proposed statute defines the scope
of the legislation, including the technologies regulated by the
statute. In this section of the statute, I tried to reflect the
foundational principle of regulating police surveillance technologies
by creating a tightly defined scope of presently available
technologies that fall under the statute’s regulatory purview.
This might make the statute under-inclusive at some point in
330
331

Harmon, supra note 21, at 10-11.
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the future, but works to the benefit of avoiding over-inclusivity
that can stifle the development of new technologies.332
§1 Applicability, Definitions, and Scope
This statute applies to all community surveillance
technologies used by law enforcement that collect
personally identifiable, locational data.
“Community surveillance technology” means any device
intended to observe, compare, record, or ascertain
information about individuals in public through the
recording of personally identifiable information. This
includes, but is not limited to, surveillance collected with
automatic license plate readers, surveillance cameras,
and surveillance cameras with biometric recognition.
This scope provision specifically addresses community
surveillance devices, such as ALPR and surveillance cameras,
as distinguished from traditional surveillance tools like GPS
devices and wiretaps. As I have previously argued, “networked
community surveillance technologies like ALPR surveil an
entire community as opposed to a specific individual.”333 While
the use of a GPS device to monitor the movements of one
criminal suspect over a long period of time might be
constitutionally problematic, such a practice raises an entirely
different set of public policy questions. At minimum, the kind of
tracking at issue in Jones was narrowly tailored to only affect
one criminal suspect. The digitally efficient investigative state
uses community surveillance technologies like ALPR and
surveillance cameras that can potentially track the movements
of all individuals within an entire community regardless of
whether there is any suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. Hence,
this statute is carefully limited to a small subset of technologies
that pose similar risks and thus require similar regulation.
2. Differential Treatment of Observational Comparison
and Indiscriminate Data Collection
Next, I propose that state laws should differentiate
between observational comparison and indiscriminate data
collection. 334 The model law permits the use of community
See supra Part III.A.
Rushin, supra note 8, at 317.
334 See supra Part I.A (defining and distinguishing between observational
comparison and indiscriminate data collection).
332
333
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surveillance technologies for observational comparison. When a
department uses these technologies for observational comparison,
the device is “an incredibly efficient law enforcement tool that is
reasonably tailored to only flag the suspicious.”335
§2 Observational Comparison and Indiscriminate Data
Collection
Police departments may use community surveillance
technologies as needed for observational comparison. But
police departments using community surveillance
technologies for indiscriminate data retention must
abide by data integrity, access, and privacy restrictions
outlined in §3 through §6.
“Observational comparison” is defined as the retention of
locational or identifying data after an instantaneous
cross-reference with a law enforcement database reveals
reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing.
“Indiscriminate data collection” is defined as the
retention of locational or identifying data without any
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing.
This distinction strikes a reasonable balance by
facilitating law enforcement efficiency in identifying lawbreakers,
but also avoiding the unlimited and unregulated collection of
data. When applied to ALPR, this statute would mean that police
could use that technology to flag passing license plates that
match lists of stolen cars or active warrants. But they could not
retain locational data on license plates that do not raise any
concerns of criminal activity without abiding by the regulations
that follow.
3. Data Integrity, Access, and Privacy
I recommend that the indiscriminate collection of data
be subject to four separate requirements that limit the
retention, identification, access, and sharing of data. The
statutory language below was designed to give law enforcement
some leeway to create workable internal policies that meet
organizational and community needs. As a result, the policy
simply serves as a minimum floor of regulation, above which
departments could adopt their own regulations.
335

Rushin, supra note 8, at 285.
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§3 Data Retention
Police departments using community surveillance
technologies for indiscriminate data collection must
establish and publicly announce a formalized policy on
data retention. Departments may not retain and store
data for more than one calendar year unless the data is
connected to a specific and ongoing criminal
investigation.
The one-year retention period is the most significant
regulation this statute would place on indiscriminate data
collection. Even the IACP acknowledges that the “indefinite
retention of law enforcement information makes a vast amount
of data available for potential misuse or accidental
disclosure.” 336 Without limits on retention, police surveillance
can develop into “a form of undesirable social control” that can
actually “prevent people from engaging in activities that
further their own self-development, and inhibit individuals
from associating with others, which is sometimes critical for the
promotion of free expression.” 337 At the same time, law
enforcement often claim that information that seems irrelevant
today may someday have significance to a future investigation.338
Without regulation, there is a cogent argument to be made that
police would have every incentive to keep as much data as
possible.339 Thus, I recommend that data retention be capped at
one year. This would prevent the potential harms of the
digitally efficient investigative state that come from long-term
data aggregation.
The one-year time window represents a reasonable
compromise. The median law enforcement department today
retains data for around six months or less. 340 But before
accepting this retention limit, state legislatures should
critically assess their own state needs to determine whether
there is a legitimate and verifiable need for retention beyond
this point. The next section of the statute addresses
identification of stored data.

336
337
338
339
340

IACP PRIVACY ASSESSMENT, supra note 281, at 36.
Id.
Id. at 37.
Rushin, supra note 8, at 321.
See supra Part I.C.
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§4 Data Identification
Police employees must have a legitimate law enforcement
purpose in identifying the person associated with any
data retained by community surveillance technologies.
The limit on data identification is somewhat different
than most current statutory arrangements. This measure
would, potentially, limit the ability of law enforcement to use
the stored data for secondary uses. A secondary use is the use
of data collected for one purpose for an unrelated, additional
purpose.341 This kind of secondary use can “generate[ ] fear and
uncertainty over how one’s information will be used in the
future.”342 By limiting the identification of the data, the statute
attempts to prevent such secondary use. Another way to avoid
secondary use is to limit access to data and external sharing, as
I attempt to do in the next portions of the statute.
§5 Internal Access to Stored Data
Departments must establish a formal internal policy
documenting each time a police employee accesses
community surveillance databases. Departments shall
not allow anyone except authorized and trained police
employees to access and search these databases.
§6 External Data Sharing
Police departments may share information contained in
community surveillance databases with other government
agencies, as long as all participating departments honor
the minimum requirements established in this statute.
I propose that police limit access to data even among
police employees. And each time a police employee accesses
data, I require that the department document this event. This
achieves two results. First, it creates a record of previous
access points that the attorney general or state criminal courts
can, theoretically, use to hold police accountable for improper
data access. Secondly, and relatedly, this formalized
documentation process may prevent nefarious secondary uses
of the information. Because some evidence suggests that police
retain community surveillance data in databases accessible to

341
342

See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 521 (2006).
IACP PRIVACY ASSESSMENT, supra note 281, at 15.
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private companies and civilians,343 this would place the impetus
on police departments to take responsibility for internal data
management. And while the model statute does not limit the
sharing of digitally efficient data, it does require that all
departments with access to data abide by the statutory limits.
This would promote the sharing of data across jurisdictional
lines to facilitate efficient investigations, while providing a
consistent level of minimum privacy protection in the state.
4. Enforcement Mechanisms
To ensure that departments abide by these minimal
regulations, I propose a combination of enforcement
mechanisms. The judicial and legislative branches have
previously used these three enforcement mechanisms in other
contexts to regulate police misconduct. By permitting a wide
range of enforcement mechanisms, the statute attempts to
avoid the traditional problems associated with police and
organizational regulation. The first enforcement mechanism
involves evidentiary exclusion.
§7 Evidentiary Exclusion
All evidence acquired by law enforcement in violation of
this statute shall be inadmissible in state criminal
courts.
The judiciary generally excludes evidence obtained in
violation of the constitution. This mechanism is “by far the
most commonly used means of discouraging police misconduct
and perhaps the most successful.” 344 Empirical evidence
suggests that evidentiary exclusion can change law
enforcement behavior and incentivize compliance with the
law. 345 But the exclusionary rule suffers from several
limitations. As Rachel Harmon has explained, the exclusionary
rule is “riddled with exceptions and limitations, many of which
are inconsistent with using the exclusionary rule as an
343 NICHOLS, supra note 72, at 8 (noting that only 53% of surveillance camera
operators are sworn police officers).
344 Harmon, supra note 21, at 10.
345 See, e.g., William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the
Law, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 311, 339-40 (1991) (arguing that while police often did
not always comply with Fourth Amendment protections, they were more likely to do so
if the rules were simplified); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The Exclusionary Rule
and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1016, 1017 (1987) (arguing that the exclusionary rule did influence internal policies in
the Chicago Police Department).
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effective deterrent of police misconduct.” 346 Thus, if the
misconduct happens to fall into one of these many exceptions,
the exclusionary rule may not be an effective deterrent. But
perhaps more importantly, as Harmon explains, “the scope of
the exclusionary rule is inevitably much narrower than the
scope of illegal police misconduct.”347 After all, the exclusionary
rule would only work as a mechanism for preventing police
misuse of digitally efficient databases if the police intended to
use the resulting evidence in a criminal trial. But much of the
misconduct I discuss in this article and previous work involves
police utilizing retained data for undetermined secondary
purposes. The exclusionary rule may do little to prevent this
type of misconduct. To remedy this problem, I propose two
other enforcement mechanisms.
§8 Attorney General Right of Action
The Attorney General of this state shall have a civil right
of action against any police department that engages in a
pattern or practice of violating this statute.
§9 State Audit of Departmental Policy
The Attorney General of this state shall have the
authority to periodically audit departmental policies to
ensure compliance with this statute. The Attorney
General will publicly post the results of this audit to
bring attention to noncompliant departments.
Two of the statutes currently in operation only classify
the violation of data retention and access policies as a minor
criminal act. 348 In theory, these laws could result in the
prosecution of a police officer who fails to abide by their
parameters. But as Harmon concludes, “prosecutions against
police officers are too rare to deter misconduct.” 349 This is
because juries tend to sympathize with defendant police
officers, and the criminal prosecution of minor misconduct is
rarely among the top priorities for over-worked prosecutors.350
Consequently, I avoid establishing criminal liability for officers
who violate this statute. Instead, I suggest that the state
Harmon, supra note 21, at 10.
Id. at 10-11.
348 See supra Part III.B.
349 Harmon, supra note 21, at 9.
350 Id. (explaining how “juries frequently believe and sympathize with
defendant officers” and how prosecution of police officers is both inconsistent and “too
rare to deter misconduct”).
346
347
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attorney general office should take on a proactive role in
ensuring compliance through suing noncompliant agencies and
occasionally auditing departmental policies.
The first alternative enforcement mechanism gives the
state attorney general statutory authority to bring suit against
departments that engage in a pattern of practice of violating
this statute. This is similar to the statutory mandate given to
the Department of Justice (DOJ) by 42 U.S.C. §14141.351 Police
scholar Barbara Armacost has called §14141 “perhaps the most
promising
mechanism”
for
addressing
organizational
misconduct.352 The late Bill Stuntz even believed that §14141 may
be “more significant, in the long run, than Mapp v. Ohio . . . which
mandated the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.” 353 Pattern and practice litigation, as
authorized in §14141, is unique because it permits the DOJ to
bring federal suit against police departments that engage in
systematic misconduct; in practice, the DOJ successfully
ensured the appointment of judicial monitors in targeted cities
to oversee organizational and policy reform.354 Although there is
only a small amount of empirical research on the effectiveness of
§14141 in reducing police misconduct, the available evidence
suggests it is one of the most effective means of bringing about
organizational change.355 One of the only potential pitfalls of this
form of regulation is that the state attorney general may have
limited resources. 356 If resource constraints make lawsuits
unlikely for noncompliant departments, a police agency might
rationally calculate that the benefits of noncompliance outweigh
the potential costs of litigation.357
To remedy the concern over resource limitations, I
propose that the state attorney general have statutory
351 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2011) (giving the Department of Justice the authority to
bring suit against police departments that engage in a pattern or practice of
unconstitutional misconduct).
352 Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 457 (2004).
353 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505, 538-39 n.134 (2001).
354 Harmon, supra note 21, at 20-21 (explaining that “§ 14141 achieves its
intended purpose: it authorizes structural reform litigation”).
355 See SAMUEL WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 192
(2005) (stating that “[f]ederal pattern or practice litigation has been instrumental in
bringing together disparate reform programs into [a] coherent package”).
356 Harmon, supra note 21, at 3 (noting the “limited resources” that
“hampered” the implementation and effectiveness of § 14141).
357 Id. (explaining that “according to deterrence theory, a rational actor will
engage in conduct when doing so provides a positive expected return in light of the
actor’s utility function . . . [meaning that] a police department will adopt remedial
measures to prevent misconduct when doing so is a cost-effective means of reducing the
net costs of police misconduct or increasing the net benefits of protecting civil rights”).
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authority to audit police departments. This would expand the
regulatory reach of the statute while also harnessing the power
of public opinion to force police compliance. This would also
guarantee regular interaction between the attorney general
and local departments, allowing the attorney general to check
up on data practices. Rather than facing only the remote
possibility of a pattern or practice lawsuit, departments would be
faced with regular, random audits of their data policies. Because
the results of this regular audit system would be posted online,
the departments would also be publicly accountable if they fail to
abide by the statute. This could incentivize administrators to
follow state law for fear of public embarrassment that could
threaten their job security. Rachel Harmon has suggested the
DOJ utilize a similar policy to overcome resource limits and
expand the potential impact of §14141.358
In sum, these regulations attempt to holistically
regulate the digitally efficient investigative state by limiting
data retention and ensuring stored data are handled in a way
that protects individual privacy, while still leaving ample room
for legitimate law enforcement purposes. The enforcement
mechanisms are sufficiently varied to ensure widespread
compliance. And the statute as a whole follows the foundational
principles of police surveillance regulations. The regulations are
clear enough to avoid organizational mediation. They allow for
individual variation. And they define the scope narrowly to only
include a small subset of technologies like ALPR and
surveillance cameras that pose a similar social risk.
CONCLUSION
The digitally efficient investigative state is here to stay.
The empirical evidence clearly demonstrates that extremely
efficient community surveillance technologies are an increasingly
important part of American law enforcement. The language in
Jones suggests that the judiciary may somehow limit public
surveillance technologies in the future. To do so, the Court will
have to confront the jurisprudential assumptions of police
surveillance. That is no easy task. Much of the Court’s previous
treatment of police surveillance has rested on the belief that
individuals have no expectation of privacy in public places, and
358 Harmon describes how the Department of Justice could publish longer lists
of departments that are suspected of a pattern or practice litigation and notify these
departments that the worst offending departments will be prosecuted first. This “worst
first” method would motivate a long list of departments that may be in violation of the
statute to implement reforms for fear of lawsuit. Id. at 26-28.
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that surveillance technologies that merely improve the efficiency
of police investigations comport with the Fourth Amendment.
At present, it remains unclear how and when the Court
will begin to alter these important assumptions. The language
in Jones offers little guidance. But even when the Court does
eventually broach this subject, the judiciary’s institutional
limitations will prevent it from crafting the type of expansive
solution necessary to protect against the harms of the digitally
efficient investigative state. In the absence of regulation, police
departments across the country have developed dramatically
different policies on the use of public surveillance technologies.
Legislative bodies must take the lead and proactively limit the
retention, identification, access, and sharing of personal data
acquired by digitally efficient public surveillance technologies.
The model state statute proposed in this Article would be a
substantial step in reigning in the “unregulated efficiency of
emerging investigative and surveillance technologies.”359

359

Rushin, supra note 8, at 328.

